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# *PEMBANGUNAN* OR *KOLONIALISME*?
# ADMINISTERING DEVELOPMENT IN EAST TIMOR

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# DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary educational institution.

Signed:.......................................................... Date:...24... February 1997

# ABSTRACT

This thesis raises fundamental questions about the relative benefits of the New Order's twenty years of economic development, *pembangunan* in the former Portuguese colony East Timor. The achievements of *pembangunan* over the last two decades of Indonesian occupation are exceptional compared to five-hundred years under Portuguese rule. But, whilst economic 'development' brought about significant changes, such as, the rising of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and more people have access to education, health, and so on, there have also been negative outcomes as indicated by the dramatic increase in population as a result of massive immigration, the loss of life on the Timorese side, the *indígenas*' lack of control over their resources, and the widening gap between the rich (mostly migrants) and the deprived. There has also been signs of increasing dissatisfaction amongst those with little or no memory of the invasion of 1975 who were expected to react positively to the generosity of Indonesians. Using my first hand experience combined with secondary research I conclude that Indonesia's attempt to pacify the inhabitants of the eastern part of the island of Timor is not only illegal and brutal but has encouraged the emergence of a 'nationalist' demand for freedom and more specifically for self-determination by the people of East Timor.

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# ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ABRI: *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), which was formed in the early 1940s, by officials of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) and the PETA, the armed forces set up by the Japanese between 1943 and 1945.

BABINSA: *Bintara Pembina Desa* (Village-Guidance Official), representing the armed force.

Bappeda: *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Regional Development Planning Board).

BIA: *Badan Inteligen ABRI* (Indonesian Armed Forces Intelligence Bureau) which, before 25 January 1994, was known as BAIS (*Badan Inteligen Strategis* or 'Strategic Intelligence Bureau).

BINPOLDA: *Bintara Polisi Desa* (Village-Police Official), representing the police force.

*Bufo*(s): A Portuguese term meaning spy (spies).

*Bupati*: Head of a district (*kabupaten*).

*Camat*: Head of a sub-district (*kecamatan*).

*Desa*: Village.

DIP: The Indonesian acronym for *Daftar Isian Proyek* (Approved Project Budget).

*Dwifungsi*: A doctrine that was introduced in 1958 that requires the armed forces to perform 'double functions' both in national defence and social, economic (e.g., state-owned enterprises) and political affairs, including reserved allocations of seats in the parliament, foreign embassies and prominent posts in the civil service.

FRETILIN: *Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente* (Front for the Liberation of East Timor), a leftist party which was founded by graduates of the (Jesuit) seminary.

Golkar: *Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups). The government political party under the New Order state, with the ABRI remaining the dominant element.

ITP: Indonesian Transmigration Program which moves (poor) people from overcrowded Java, Bali and Madura to outlying islands. The ITP has, to some extent, been a means to 'Javanise' the indigenous living in the Outer Islands.

*Kabupaten*: District.

*Kecamatan*: Sub-district.

KORPRI: *Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia* (Korps of State Employees).

*Lulic*: Magical heirloom. An object or site having a sacred or mystic quality.

New Order: The autocratic regime created by Suharto in the mid-1960s. The longevity of Suharto's New Order has been at the expense of political exclusion of political parties and suspension of democratic freedoms.

*Operasi Persatuan*: (Operation Unity) which was carried out in 1985 under the command of a Catholic General, Leonard Benjamin Murdani, as part of a systematic campaign of bombing raids, encirclement, torture and killings.

OPSTER: The Indonesian acronym for *Operasi Teritorial* (Territorial Operation) which was, intentionally, designed to gain the East Timorese sympathy for the ABRI (with the *pembangunan* cover), but soon reverted to a terrorist strategy. The executions and torture of the demonstrators at the Dili massacre were carried out by, or under orders from, the OPSTER.

*Pak (Bapak) Ketua*: (Father) Director.

*Pegawai negeri*: The Indonesian word for 'civil servant'.

*Pembangunan*: 'Development', a potent word that has been used by Suharto to sustain and increase the New Order's power. Since the early 1980s, Suharto has been styled *Bapak Pembangunan* (the 'Father of Development').

P4: *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, an indoctrination course which is compulsory for all citizens.

P.I.D.E.: *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (International and State Defence Police), which was invented during the Salazar regime in Portugal to curb any form of political opposition.

PKI: *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party) which was liquidated as a political force by Suharto and his allies in 1965; hundreds of thousands of members, their respective families, alleged sympathisers were subsequently slaughtered.

POLWIL: *Polisi Wilayah* (Regional Police Headquarter) at provincial level.

*Priyayi*: In pre-colonial times, the Javanese *priyayi*, also known as *abdidalem* (officials), served in the traditional Javanese kingdoms and constituted the second most powerful class after the *rajahs* (kings). Co-opted by Dutch colonizers, the *priyayi* became the backbone of the colonial state administration. Today, they remain the most privileged class in Indonesia.

*Surat Jalan*: (Travel Permit), a special permit which was introduced in East Timor in 1976 and gradually abolished in the early 1990s. It was a means to control population movement from one place to another.

*Tetum*: The East Timorese *lingua franca*.

UDT: *União Democrática Timorense* (Timorese Democratic Union), was made up of conservative members who had, socially and economically, an affinity for the (Portuguese) colonial regime and which initially favoured continued Portuguese rule.

# INTRODUCTION

> *The rape of a motherland is far worse than the rape of actual mothers; the death of a nation is the ultimate tragedy, beyond the death of flesh and blood.* (Billig 1995, p. 4)

The aim of this thesis is to show that Indonesia's imposition of *pembangunan* in East Timor constitutes a form of colonial occupation that is not only similar to that of European colonialism, but in some ways is a more oppressive and destructive form of imperial control. This thesis also offers a different view of *pembangunan*, the Indonesian word for economic 'development', in East Timor and of the relationship between Indonesia, the 'developer', and East Timor, the 'under-developed'. This relationship has been characterised by the implementation of a new form of colonisation, which seeks to disarm growing 'nationalist' demands for freedom amongst the peoples of East Timor. There is little doubt that in the near future *pembangunan*, which continues to be falsely depicted as a program which respects human rights and promotes notions of self-determination and freedom, will fade.

Those who recognise, or support, Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor have been inclined to 'avoid dwelling on the less palatable aspects of the Timor saga' (Schwarz 1994, p. 206). In their view, the New Order's commitment to *pembangunan nasional* 'national development', which may have benefited some sections of the Timorese community, must not be mistaken as encompassing issues like, respect for human rights, self-determination, and freedom. Since Indonesia's annexation and occupation of the former Portuguese colony in 1975, such issues have become less important or even anathema for Indonesia, whose priority has been to put forward economic growth or safeguard Indonesia's national interest. So whilst the Indonesian government has pretended to consider human rights through the promotion of *pembangunan*, which recognises and respects human rights, in reality *pembangunan* has served as an excuse for perpetuating Indonesian rule over East Timor. Whether 'development' is really able to promote and ensure respect for human rights is arguable, however this issue will not be specifically addressed in this thesis.

Although Indonesia has incorporated East Timor within its borders and embarked upon the economic development of its 'twenty-seventh province', the status of East Timor as a province of Indonesia remains a transparent falsehood. East Timor has become Indonesia's second colony, after West Papua which was annexed in 1963. So far, the economic 'development' of East Timor has not helped to suppress the image of the barbaric nature of Indonesia's illegal occupation of the territory. John Taylor's *Indonesia's Forgotten War* (1991)[1] documents the inconceivable suffering brought on the East Timorese by the on-going 'Indonesianization' of their territory.

My analysis is far from 'scientific'. Rather this thesis is a personal interpretation by someone who has lived through the years of Indonesian colonialism, and was closely involved with the process of 'development' in the region. I have used two different styles moving between personal recollection and academic analysis. The first two chapters contain my personal story and some of my experiences and observations during the early months of my apprenticeship in the 'development' bureaucracy of East Timor. These chapters provide the gloomy picture, which has also characterised earlier studies on the continuing struggle for self-determination, of the New Order's self-serving *pembangunan* administration of the disputed territory. Whilst *pembangunan* was deployed to make Indonesians forget the memories of the carnage of 1966, in East Timor it encouraged the emergence of a 'nationalist consciousness', particularly among the generation that was supposed to forget the memories of the atrocities, killings, terror, and intimidation of 1975. Chapter 3 describes the impact of *pembangunan*, with particular emphasis on demographic trends and the environment. The psychological state of the Timorese is also considered. In Chapter 4, I look at the Indonesian political system from a 'patrimonialist' perspective, and also at related aspects of the history of the colonial period through to the evolution of the modern New Order state. The main concern of Chapter 4 is the political aspects of ***pembangunan***, economic development. The last chapter, provides a conclusion, in which I outline my argument that *pembangunan*, despite its presentation as a program of 'beneficial development', nevertheless constitutes a justification and camouflage for the essentially imperialistic and coercive character of Indonesian control over East Timor.

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[1] Taylor, who has been engaged with developments in East Timor, offers the most comprehensive and meticulous study on the history of the territory, from pre-colonial times to the period following the Indonesian invasion of 1975.

# CHAPTER ONE

# COMING of AGE

## Introduction: The Colonial Legacy, the Portuguese 'Civilising Mission' and the Awakening of Timorese Nationalism 1600 to the early 1970s

The purpose of this chapter is to provide, in very general terms, an overview of the two important historical periods that have, in many ways, shaped the lives of most East Timorese and my life in particular, namely, Portuguese rule which ended in 1974 and the Indonesian invasion of 1975. Being born and brought up under Portuguese colonialism and later, experiencing the brutal Indonesian occupation has demonstrated to me how humans are rendered as objects of exploitation and are reduced to a state of helplessness and despair. The East Timorese continue to bear the countless wounds that the two colonial powers have inflicted on them. A consideration of the two periods is important because it provides some background to indicate that the Timorese continue to live under volatile situations against which they have constantly resisted. Throughout the nineteenth century through to the early twentieth century, the East Timorese have revolted against the yoke of the Portuguese empire, which was mainly built on the spice trade. The resistance has strengthened and has become even more organised since the last two decades of Indonesian invasion, which occurred in the context of bringing 'development' and liberation to the old but separated brothers.

The Portuguese empire in this part of the world was built on the spice trade. The Portuguese initially arrived, in the sixteenth century, in search of the aromatic sandalwood that covered the mountains, and the other spices, which they sold at great profit in India and Persia. In 1436, one official of the Ming dynasty wrote, in the *Hsing-ch'a Sheng-lan*, that Timor, also called 'Tiwu', was an island that attracted outsiders for its sandalwood and spices. Sandalwood in particular had not only been of supreme importance for the Chinese who 'delighted in its fragrance' for their *hius* (sticks), but also the *Brahmans* of India who regarded this fragrant wood as a necessity for their religious ceremonies (Figueiredo 1975; Duarte 1944). Until the late nineteenth century, East Timor remained 'a neglected trading post' (Schwarz 1994, p. 198).

The industrialization of Europe in the nineteenth century brought about significant changes in attitude towards non-European peoples. During this time the peoples of Europe began to believe in 'evolution' and 'the survival of the fittest'. This led to the creation of the dichotomous self/other logos of colonial power - coloniser and colonised, white and non-white, modern and archaic, civilised and primitive, developed and underdeveloped. It was increasingly seen that Europe's burden was to bring 'civilisation' to the natives of the East. The agents of Portuguese imperium who believed in their cultural and racial superiority, saw it as their 'duty' to 'civilise' the *indígenas do Ultramar* (Overseas) and to impose their cultural forms on the *Ultramarinos* through their main vehicle of transmission, the education system. The Portuguese Prime Minister, Salazar, instituted the policy of forming *novos estados* (new states) out of the Portuguese colonies, including East Timor, along the lines of what he called 'the civilised European states', like Portugal! These colonies were to follow the Portuguese system of education, culture and security (Marques 1976; Duarte 1944; Taylor 1991, pp. 12-13). The recruitment of military officials into the administration was aimed at implementing Portugal's 'civilising mission' under centralised political control, thus bringing the *estados* under direct rule by Lisbon.[2] However, the 'civilising mission' was carried out by the most underdeveloped country in Europe. As a result, Portugal was not able to lay a viable economic base in its own colonies. Through oppression and constant intimidation, the situation in the *Estado* was brought under colonial control and all traces of rebellion were thought to have been crushed. But, Portugal did everything in its attempt to hide the impact of the 'civilising mission' on the colonies.

Moreover, as part of the campaign to weaken the East Timorese society, the Portuguese administrators instituted a kind of racial division. In East Timor there were two distinct groups: the first was seen as an inferior degenerate people and the second, a superior, and privileged elite. The former were labelled as *indígenas* (also known as *unassimilated* natives), whereas the latter were the *não indígenas*, which included *mestiços* (of partial native and European extraction) and *assimilados/ civilizados* (or *assimilated/ civilised* natives). If you were an *indígena*, you were a third-class person; you could never be equal with respect to landowning rights, freedom of movement and speech, and access to state institutions. In theory, however, a native (*indígena*) could gain the status of *assimilado/ civilised* and acquire Portuguese citizenship if he/she spoke Portuguese, had a reasonable income to support his/her family, and possessed a good character (Weatherbee 1966, p. 684). But, if the *assimilado* system were to be applied in Portugal it would not even work because the majority of the (white) Portuguese people were illiterate and did not speak 'good' Portuguese.

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[2] In order to more exert control over East Timor and rebuild this overseas colony as a result of World War II, Portugal employed brutal methods such as, 'forced labour' which was used 'to develop crops [such as, cocoa, copra, rubber, and coffee], and extend the trading system' (Taylor 1991, p. 14; 1995, p. 333; Francis 1960, p. 12).

One general distinction between *mestiços* and *indígenas*, was that, *mestiços* belonged to the elite of 'assimilated' intellectuals who identified themselves by maintaining good relationships with the (white) Portuguese in order to safeguard the *status quo* and Portuguese domination in return for white patronage; on the other hand, the *indígenas*, the least privileged ones, who had experienced no significant foreign cultural influences, often resisted white colonial expansion. In theory, the colonial system guaranteed Timorese citizenship provided they went through a process of 'evolution' or conversion from their Animistic beliefs to a good command of Portuguese and the adoption of the *usos e costumes* (habits and customs) that conformed to the demands of Portuguese common law (Marques 1976, p. 45).

However, the indigenous-assimilated system did not work at least in the areas of agriculture production and workforce. In terms of agriculture, the natives could only cultivate a piece of land and its harvest was simply to fulfill their basic needs (subsistence); the non-indigenous, however, employed the indigenous to work on their lands often at a very low price and with long working hours. In general, the natives were forced to grow their crops on less fertile lands that did not even belong to them because fertile lands were being appropriated by a number of *mestiços* or other non-indigenous and the Catholic missions. On these fertile lands, the non-indigenous grew coffee, rubber, cocoa, at the expense of cheap labour. These commodities were partly exported and the rest were sold to the indigenous. The same practice prevailed in the workforce. For example, whilst the indigenous were excluded from professional jobs and were employed as cleaners, clerks or drivers, the *mestiços* and non-indigenous occupied relatively professional positions. This practice was evidence that racial discrimination was in place, although under the Portuguese law racism was not admited by the state (Figueiredo 1975, pp. 163-166, 172-176; Taylor 1991, pp. 8-9, 13, 18; Duarte 1944).

What then was left of the Timorese after almost five centuries of Portuguese colonisation? A few facts will suffice to indicate how the Timorese were left behind until just before Portuguese withdrawal from East Timor. For example, in the fifty years since the original law of 1917, the concession to become a 'civilised' member of society never applied to more than a token number of Timorese; only 0.25% of the total population of 442,378 had benefited from a Portuguese education which gave them the *assimilado* status (Duarte 1944; Cox and Carey 1995, p. 14). Portugal's attempt to assert control over East Timor had resulted in the creation of a minimal educated group, the members of which were granted *assimilado* status. At school, whilst Portuguese history, including conquests around the globe, geography and culture were taught to the natives, the heroes of East Timor were excluded from history. The use of *Tetum*, the Timorese *lingua franca*, was not permitted at schools. In addition, when the Portuguese left the colony, in mid-1975, more than 90% of Timorese were still illiterate; there were 20 doctors for almost 600,000 people who lived scattered in the mountaineous island of approximately 15,000 square kilometres with poor communication facilities; less than 30 kilometres of roads had been asphalted. Also, malnutrition was widespread, the infant mortality rate was more than 50%, and a significant number of Timorese, mostly in rural areas, suffered from tuberculosis and malaria. The income per capita was US$60 in the early 1970s. East Timor's economic structure was dominated by agriculture, and so on.[3]

The inequitable colonial social structure, combined with poor infrastructure and service. Together with the absence of freedom, and the introduction of the *imposto*[4] in 1908 this generated 'national' revolts. 'Nationalist' revolts in the colonies, including East Timor, were, in a sense, a rejection of the so-called 'civilisation' and 'cristianisation' which were regarded as alien by the colonised peoples. As Taylor (1995, p. 334) pointed out, there was 'widespread resentment among the Timorese' as a result of the various repressive measures used to exert more control over the colony, particularly in the exploitation of labour. Consequently, from 1894 to 1913, the inhabitants of the territory under the leadership of Dom Boaventura, King of Manufahi, launched a series of drawn out revolts to free themselves from the yoke of the Portuguese imperium. At least 3,000 indigenous people died in these conflicts while some 4,000 were captured. But this revolt was crushed in August 1912 by the Portuguese troops from Mozambique and Macau (Taylor 1991, p. 11; Schwarz 1994, p. 199).

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[3] On more health and welfare figures see (Hastings 19755, pp. 25-26; UN 1976; Cox and Carey 1995, p. 14).

[4] Or a 'head tax' which was collected from all Timorese (males) aged between 18 and 60. Given the level of the widespread poverty in East Timor, the indigenous had to produce above their subsistence level in order to pay their *imposto*.

Needless to say the formation of new *estados* and the 'civilising' mission was intended to bring about the resurgence of the Catholic Church within Salazar's corporatist colonial system. Based on an accord between the Vatican and Portugal in the 1940s, the Catholic missions regained a privileged position as an 'instrument of civilisation and national influence' in the empire. The Catholic Church was instructed to dissiminate education in accordance with the ideological doctrines of the state and to follow programs and projects proposed by the government. After 1941, education in the *Ultramar* was entrusted to the Catholic Church under the auspices of the state (Figueiredo 1975, p. 78; Taylor 1991, p. 13). Thus in the eyes of the inhabitants, these priests were regarded more as 'chaplains' to the colonial administration than as missionaries. The Catholic Church was, in a sense, a powerful symbol of Portuguese authority, particularly in rural areas. This was reflected in the earlier teachings of Catholicism in rural areas which benefitted the Portuguese colonisation schemes. For example, laymen were taught to always comply with the laws and regulations of the state and that failure to obey them would end in crop failure. Thus, instead of preaching God as love, the priests tended to cultivate the idea of God as just. The Church was the Portuguese people's church, the strangers' church; indeed, Portuguese or Latin - not *Tetum* (the indigenous's *lingua franca*) - were the languages used in the liturgy (Hull 1992). Interestingly, however, it was the Catholic seminaries that contributed to the preparation of future 'nationalist' cadres.[5]

Following the relatively increasing number of educated Timorese from the seminaries and following the barbarities against the 'rebels' of 1912, the Portuguese *conquistadores* did not continue their physical oppression of the Timorese, although other methods of punishment were introduced. During the late 1950s, many Timorese were in revolt against the activities of the Portuguese Secret Police, the P.I.D.E. (*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado*) that had been in the territory since World War II. This resulted in the gaoling and death of many Timorese, particularly, those who expressed their desire to free East Timor from the yoke of colonialism. Regarded as a threat to the regime, they were even deported to Angola or Mozambique as punishment.[6] East Timor was a place where the Press had to be *Visada pela Censura* (Approved by the Censor) and this lasted until the early 1970s when the Portuguese empire was on the brink of collapse. The censorship machine exercised by the P.I.D.E. exemplified a form of intellectual colonisation because anything which was labelled as 'critical' to the regime was prohibited. It can be said that Salazar had succeeded in creating the 'order' in the Portuguese empire that he needed to maintain and develop his colonisation schemes. Local resistance to the Portuguese was evidence of a growing 'nationalism' amongst the Timorese. If Portuguese colonialism generated 'nationalist' rebellions, the widespread use of *Tetum* language, both by the Catholic Church and the East Timorese was to become a further source of the development of nationalism in East Timor. More will be said of such sources of resistance to external power in later chapters.

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[5] For example, both the president and vice-president of the FRETILIN party, namely Francisco Xavier do Amaral and the late Nicolau Lobato, were seminarists. Xanama Gusmão also studied in a Catholic seminary.

[6] In 1959 there was a revolt against Portuguese colonisers in the Viqueque region, some 200 kilometres east off Dili, whose supporters and their families were executed by the Portuguese troops. More than fifty people were exiled to Angola and Mozambique. For more details see Taylor 1991, p. 21).

## Being Born a *Mestiço*: *Genealogia*, Childhood and Schooldays

I was born a *mestiço,* some thirty seven years ago, in the Portuguese colonial capital, Dili, where I grew up. My maternal grandfather, a Goan businessman of *Brahman* caste, had devoted most of his life building up a business as a *comprador* of spices and *vendedor* of his own high-quality silk textile product, only for his sons to see it dismantled in World War II. He left East Timor in the late 1960s and died at the age of 80 in India. Married to a Chinese (*assimilado*) woman, my grandfather had two sons, Luximides and João, and two daughters, Auxiliadora and Fátima. The latter is my mother. Luximides, the eldest son, is a mechanical engineer and has worked for many years at the Dili Power Station. The youngest son left East Timor at a younger age to continue his studies at the *Universidade de Coimbra*. As an Obstetrician, João has worked for the Coimbra's Hospital in Portugal. Unlike Luximides and João, my mother has spent most of her life as a housewive and later a priest.

Unlike my maternal grandfather, my paternal grandfather José was a white lieutenant who had won a dozen medals, such as the *Cruz de Aviz* medal, for his 'courage' and 'patriotism' enforcing Portugal's sovereignty in Angola and Mozambique during the early 1900s. He was appointed the general commander of East Timor around the time the Timorese resistance intensified. While in Angola and Mozambique, this colonial hero contributed to the implementation of the military subjugation of those territories. However in spite of military subjugation, Portuguese authority in Africa and East Timor was limited to some fortresses in the coastal areas and a few villages due to continuing local resistance. Not only this, but the geographical features of these colonies posed insuperable hardships for Portuguese colonisation. Like the history of Angola and Mozambique up to the beginning of the twentieth century the history of East Timor was one of constant resistance, marked by Salazar's failure to unite the tribal groups.

My grandfather was, along with other colonial officials, directed to carry out the Prime Minister's policy (launched in 1926) of forming the *Estado Novo* within the overall framework of the Portuguese imperium. Three years after Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces ending World War II, José died of an incurable infection which had developed on his face as a result of injuries caused by flying splinters during the War. He had married Amélia, an *indígena* and a descendant of Dom Boaventura. Though she was illiterate, she encouraged her children to study hard. She was a woman with a wonderful sense of humour, and she loved us very much. My grandmother died two years before the Indonesian invasion, at the age of 85 in Dili. From her marriage, two daughters were born, Adelaide, Hermínia who died of cancer, and a son, my father.

Being born a *mestiço* my father, Seabra, served the colonial administration. He devoted more than thirty years working as a civil servant in various government departments until he was finally demoted in mid-1969. His last job was as the treasurer of the customs office in Dili. He was a man often described by his workmates as 'dogmatic', strong-willed, and thoroughly just. At home, he repaired radios and other electronic equipment to keep his huge family going.

In 1969, however, he was badly injured in an accident when he was struck by a large piece of flying granite from an excavation near Dili. This left him almost paralysed. Formerly an atheist, he became a Protestant in 1970. The Gomes's were the first Timorese family to convert to the Assembly of God Church. In a nutshell, this Assembly claimed ***religionis libertas ergo***. That is, in principle, all men are equal before God, in the sense that everyone has the right to make a moral choice or hold a belief. This endowed inalienable right was to be preached throughout the island of Ataúro and some parts of East Timor in order to make the inhabitants understand and struggle to get back their dignity. It was for this belief that my father left his job, friends, and family to fulfill the Great Commandment amongst the 4,000 inhabitants of Ataúro (also known as *Pulo Cambing* or the 'Isle of Goats'). Here the people regarded themselves as descendants of the shark. During this time his career with the customs office was put in jeopardy when Valente Pires, who was the Portuguese-appointed Governor at that time, ordered the court to investigate his affairs. Later, he was demoted and accused of being against the state religion, Catholicism. As an instrument of Salazar's regime, Catholicism was in a much more priviledged position than Protestantism in terms of the ideological indoctrination of the state and, hence, the Catholic Church remained an important ingredient in securing the *Estado Novo*. Therefore, anything that sounded like 'liberalisation' or 'progress' as proclaimed by the Protestants, would be regarded as a threat to the stability of the regime.

The dramatic ending to my father's career, placed a new burden upon my mother. Indeed, she had to spend most of her time making cakes. Everything was made by hand. No electric appliances were used because they were unaffordable. Gentle in her ways and debilitated by hard work, she was soon to show that she had hidden reserves of strength which could be called upon when needed. In 1970, one year after my father was paralysed and demoted, she had the sole responsibility for bringing up the whole family on a reduced income. When my father died in 1990 from cancer, my mother assumed the role of a father, mother and priest. Formerly a devoted Catholic, she continued my father's missionary work amongst the Timorese, particularly the Ataúro.

I was my mother's second child. My sister, Luísa, was born one year before me. Luísa's studies were interrupted because my father did not want her to continue her love affair with Octávio, who was arrested and imprisoned by the Indonesian army in 1978 for being the Secretary of the Committee of FRETILIN. Moreover, my father probably harboured a masculine prejudice against sending Luísa to school, so she remained at home until she was twenty years old. After four years of separation, Luísa was forced to give up her expectations to marry Octávio. In 1982, she married a Javanese man who, at that time, was the Chief of Pertamina (the Indonesian Petroleum and Gas Company) in Dili. With her husband and two children, Luísa now lives in Jakarta. My brother, Manuel, was born three years after me. He was just fifteen when he decided not to continue his studies because he wanted to work. Three years later he began an independent life. Manuel bought a taxi and later a mini bus to run his business. But due to mismanagement, he went bankrupt. One day he was detained by the Indonesian Intelligence personnel for his involvement in various crimes against the migrants. Under the present regime, punishment often occurs for simple crimes like spitting on a migrant, or upsetting a soldier. But Manuel managed to escape from detention and migrated to Australia in 1989 where he now resides. My Mother's fourth child, my younger sister, Céu, was born two years after Manuel. She married Paulo, a businessman who recently divorced her. Their first daughter had a short life span; she died of heart complications at the age of three months, a loss that afflicted this couple. Up until the late 1980s many children died at an early age, due in part to poor medical assistance. Two years later she conceived a son, Joel, and shortly after, Paulo decided to live with another woman in Macao. Having such an unfortunate marriage, she and the new baby were soon living with my Mother in our new house in Dili. When Céu was two years old, my mother gave birth to my sister, Ana. Her last born is my youngest brother, João. Both Ana and João are talented children; Ana has a lovely singing voice and loves to spend time in creating new songs for the Assembly of God Church in Dili. Unlike my sister, Ana, João plays the guitar and the piano. Three years ago he got his degree in electronic engineering at the *Institut Teknologi Indonesia*, one of the most prestigious institutes in Jakarta established by Dr. B. J. Habibie, the Indonesian Research and Technology Minister. He now works for the East Timor Water Supply and Sanitation project (ETWSS) in Dili.

I had the most wonderful times in my early childhood. We grew up in a lovely large house in Balide just about eight hundred metres from the city centre of Dili. The house was full of beautiful furniture and had a large garden surrounded by big trees and lots of animals. We were a peaceful flock and our garden became a *fátima* (a kind of Mecca) for neighbourhood children. But that did not last long.

The year 1965 was the end of happy freedom for me. My parents decided to send me to a state primary school in Dili. My first year at school was so hard that I could not pass the exams. Indeed, unlike my sister, Luísa, I was not a brilliant student, so I had to work hard to catch up to her. In the end I had to repeat my first year. After finishing primary school in 1969, I went to the Portuguese Technical and Vocational School in Dili. This school had just opened in 1967. Because all my efforts were directed to one end, that is, to pass the exams, I did not have as much difficulty as I had in primary school. Having successfully passed my examinations, in 1972 I went to a private *liceu* (the only high school in the city) which had not become an official institution until 1960. The school was officially opened under the name 'Liceu Dr. Francisco Machado'. The building still stands today (1997) but it now functions as the Dili office of the Indonesian Department of Education and Culture. During the period between 1972 and the early 1975, more than eighty percent of its students were sons of Portuguese officials and *mestiços*; however there were also a few indigenous people and Arabs.

Getting a higher education was expensive. Although the numbers attending primary school, increased 712% between 1954 and 1974, that is, from 8,000 in 1954 to 57,000 in 1974, this increase did not have a significant impact compared to the number of the population at that time which was almost 600,000 people; in fact, 93% of the population was still illiterate in 1974. One of the reasons for this, as an observer noted in 1975, was that: 'Education is a tremendous economic burden and confers only dubious benefits on a rural family. Students' parents must pay for books and uniforms, and many large rural families can afford to send only a couple of children' to school (quoted in Taylor 1991, p. 17). Ultimately I did not go to the private *liceu* because I was a brilliant student, but because of the patronage system whereby my parents facilitated my access to the *liceu* level without my needing any particular qualification. However, the *liceu* was closed two years later and students were not allowed to come to school for their own safety. Things became increasingly unsettled in East Timor as a result of the dramatic changes that took place in Lisbon. In Dili, students began to split into factions and often became aggressive towards other students who held different views. To a very large extent, the prevailing political system under Portuguese rule was both an advantage and disadvantage to my family. As *mestiços* we were given more access to education facilities and better jobs than any other *indígenas*. This had imbued a deep belief, though perhaps an unconscious one, in our status-quo as a superior group. However, despite the benefits of the existing political system on the *mestiço* side, the system itself had turned us into a less priviledged position simply for having converted to Protestantism. The latter was regarded as enemy of the state for Protestantism contentiously challenged the state's aim of creating acquiescence amongst its citizens.

## The Collapse of the Portuguese Empire, Memories of the Civil War and the Indonesian Invasion 1974 - 1978

I came of age in what was, and is, called an *incómodo e volúvel* (uneasy and vulnerable) political environment. The enduring but relatively undisturbed period under the Portuguese *conquistadores*, ended in April 1974 with the collapse of Portugal's ageing authoritarian regime established by António de Oliveira Salazar in 1934. I was sixteen years old when the *Revolução dos Cravos* (the 'Carnation Revolution') backed by the Portuguese left-wing *Movimento das Forças Armadas*

(Armed Forces Movement) brought about a radical change in the regime from Salazar's dictatorship to democracy. The aim of the 25 April coup, according to Figueiredo (1975, pp. 235-236), was twofold. The first aim was the 'attainment of a 'political' .... peaceful, solution to the African wars through a process of decolonisation.' The second aim was the restoration of democracy and the withdrawal of the military from politics. This 'transition to democracy' had a violent impact on the Portuguese colonies, and East Timor was not an exception.

On 6 August 1975, or sixteen months after the collapse of the Salazar regime, the situation in *East Timor* lurched towards chaos. The centrist party, *União Democrática Timorense* (UDT), backed by Jakarta,[7] launched a coup intended to seize power from the Portuguese and prevent the ascendancy of FRETILIN (*Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente*). This resulted in a political vacuum. During this time, the Portuguese Governor, Col. Lemos Pires, evacuated his remaining forces to Ataúro Island, 25 miles off Dili. A civil war ensued between the two parties, which resulted in more than 2,000 deaths (Pilger 1994, p. 264; Aarons and Domm 1992, p. 14; Schwarz 1994, p. 203).

I was seventeen years old when the civil war broke out. Politics did not, at that time, enter my life. I had no knowledge of political parties, I hardly knew of their existence. I remember how the news about the death of some of my school colleagues gave rise to fear in our city, particularly amongst the *mestiços*. The war 'against' the *mestiços* was, in a sense, a result of long resentment on the part of the *indígenas*. The *mestiços* were better-off because they owned land and occupied prestigious posts in the colonial administration. It was a time when our cloudless existence on the fringe of the city centre was brought to an abrupt end. One disastrous morning, one of the armed groups shot a 60 mm-mortar at our property and destroyed it. It was seven o'clock in the morning. Inside the house, there were about forty people, most of them children and women who had come to take shelter from flying splinters and mortars. Indeed, their safety would have been in danger had they continued to stay in their own little huts. No one died, although my parents, and some children and myself were wounded by the mortar which was dropped on us. In the afternoon, a group of armed civilians came to the destroyed property and seized our belongings whilst we were all in the Dili Hospital for treatment. Treatment had become difficult as the number of wounded had increased dramatically and there was a lack of doctors and medicine. As the war worsened by the end of August 1975, the five doctors, who were working day and night under the auspices of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), had to flee the country for their own safety. So the victims had to stand in a long queue waiting for their turn to receive treatment by nurses. Some died unattended.

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[7] Before the decision to launch a coup against FRETILIN was made, some UDT leaders had 'a series of clandestine meetings' with the Indonesians (Aarons and Domm 1992, p. 14). One of the UDT founders, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, who later became the Indonesian-appointed (Itinerant) Ambassador, had 'frequent contacts with Indonesian officials and especially with Ali Murtopo', the former Indonesian Foreign Minister (Schwarz 1994, p. 202).

But UDT's strategy to hold power completely backfired and, on 29 November 1975, FRETILIN, the radical pro-independence movement, declared East Timor the *República Democrática de Timor* (Democratic Republic of East Timor), thus ending Portuguese rule for ever.

This 'freedom', however, was short-lived. The creation of political parties, freedom of expression, the end of censorship, and democracy in 1974 in East Timor were unacceptable to the eight-year old Suharto dictatorship in neighbouring Indonesia. Moreover, the emergence of a new nation-state within the Indonesian archipelago, it was believed, would become a precedent for the emergence of an independent Aceh or Irian Jaya, which would lead to a disintegration of the Indonesian Republic. Seven days later, on Sunday, 7 December 1975, the Indonesian military, which had since 1965 turned Indonesia into a *túmulo para a democracia*, launched a full-scale assault under the code *Operasi Seroja* ('Operation Lotus'), ruthlessly killing thousands of innocent and unarmed civilians. Since Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in 1975, Jakarta has employed a series of methods to assert control and at the same time, disarm East Timorese resistance. Consequently, some 200,000 Timorese, a third of the population, have died of war, repression, famine and ailments - evils imposed on the inhabitants for almost two decades by Indonesian colonialism. The worst aspect of this occupation, by predominantly Javanese troops, has been a willingness to 'liquidate' a society, a country, a national identity by the imposition of alien values. Today, East Timor continues to represent an *inferno* as whole Timorese communities have been uprooted, subjugated, dispossessed, intimidated, spied on, alienated, and their lands confiscated for the Indonesian *Program Transmigrasi*. For many, continued resistance has been the only weapon to protect themselves against the threat of complete extermination.

Living in such an *inferno*, I began to feel that what had happened concerned me personally, and could no longer be accepted with indifference. The majority of my *compatriotas* have even left East Timor for Portugal and Australia to continue their resistance abroad with the aim of inducing the Indonesian government to respect our dignity. Others have been tortured and killed for their uncompromising opposition to this new occupying force. It appeared that physical resistance against Indonesian colonisers, though sometimes necessary, was ultimately futile so I decided to embark on further education and seek an opportunity to work with the colonial administration in order to do something for our betrayed people. The latter was a dream that failed to become a reality.

## Further Education: An Escape From the *Inferno* 1978 - early 1988

In the summer of 1978 I found myself unexpectedly in a college in Malang, East Java. I was told later that it was in this college that I was going to eventually become a priest. This had been one of my father's dreams. We were taught that the drinking of all forms of alcohol, smoking, dancing, movies, and so on, were the major sins. A new language, different customs, and suspicious friends, all contributed to my alienation. All this was a nightmare I tried to escape. I revolted against my father's decision and after three years in this situation I got myself admitted to *Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana* in Salatiga, Central Java.

Going to this university brought fresh vigour to my stagnant life. Whilst in *Satya Wacana* I worked hard and was able to gain two bachelor degrees in Sociology and education, in 1985 and 1988, respectively. This time I had to work hard in order to find ways to overcome my financial problems because my parents, were now unpaid missionaries and had lost everything during the civil war and the Indonesian invasion of 1975. I never quite understood how it happened that my family went from being comparatively prosperous, with a big house, *auxiliares* (servants) and different kinds of animals, to being paupers. With a small pension equivalent to $120 a month my parents had to feed eight people in their little hut. We never had such a humiliating experience as depending entirely upon the International Red Cross for clothes and a litre of milk every week. But we were not the only ones. Starvation seemed to be widespread throughout the territory. Children dying of malnutrition while their parents were tortured to death were everyday scenes. No one could work on their land to produce food because the military had resettled those who were still alive to quell resistance.

This situation, however, did not impede my desire to search for knowledge and new challenges. My first two years as a student were not as smooth as one could wish. Nevertheless, I looked for new friends, particularly those who showed sympathy for my situation. I joined the 'East Asia Student Encounter' and I became its leader for three consecutive years. Although still embryonic, it contributed to a better understanding of social and cultural specificities among students representing the two countries. However, things went wrong financially towards the end of my studies and I was unable to pay my school fees because I lost my casual jobs as a translator and a tutor. It was not possible to ask for any money from my parents so I decided to write to Mário Carrascalão, the Governor of East Timor at that time, for support. Within a few months I was granted a scholarship. That was my passport to finishing my degrees.

## Becoming a Colonial Administrator 1988 - 1994

When I graduated from *Satya Wạcana* in 1988, I was faced with the question of what my career was to be. The future was a curious sort of blank. My ambition was neither the acquisition of wealth nor the pursuit of power. I did however want challenge, experience and excitement. Going back to Dili seemed to promise all of these. By the late 1980s Dili was enveloped in confusion, despair, and discontent; the overall situation was appalling, a condition intentionally created by the colonisers in order to promote 'Javanisation'. It was also a place where fundamental issues such as, human rights violations, loomed large; where fear, poverty, ignorance, and suffering were real demons to be fought, and where economic, social and political development were mammoth challenges.

From May 1988 to December 1994 I worked as a civil servant in the capital city of East Timor lying 400 miles off the coast of Australia's Northern Territory. Dili, a stretch of marshy coastline that later became the capital city of the island, was formerly called *Ai-dila*, which literally means papaya tree in the *Tetum* language. On 10 October 1769, Dili was officially proclaimed as the seat of Portuguese government in Timor by the Portuguese Governor, António José Teles de Menezes. Hence, Dili is a corruption of the original name. The capital was also sometimes referred to by the name *praça*, which meant the town where soldiers and government officials were concentrated.

It was in this town, once Portugal's most remote colonial outpost, that I first applied for a job in Indonesia's colonial administration. As an 'educated' *mestiço* I was sure to get a good job in the administrative service, and become a cadre of *pembangunan*. As I knew from other *mestiços* families, many of the urban 'middle class' had had privileged positions in the previous administration under the Portuguese, though others, for their extravagance and vices, lived below the poverty line. Presumably, being a part of this circle would solve some of my financial problems. At that time, Mário Carrascalão, a well-educated and experienced *mestiço,* was the Indonesian-appointed Governor of the territory. (This was his second term 1985-1990). Carrascalão was a man of vision and he had a tremendous capacity for hard work. Indeed, his extraordinary capacity to fight against corruption and his willingness to unveil human rights violations (things that had become a routine matter in the territory since 1975) were evident from the time he became governor in 1980. A descendant of a Portuguese dissident who had been exiled to Portuguese Timor, Carrascalão was a tough decision-maker. He was the one who decided to end East Timor's isolation in 1988.

For thirteen years, East Timor had remained closed to the outside world, making it extremely difficult for the national/ international media to verify what was happening there. Indeed, this closure made it easy for Jakarta to plead ignorance of the atrocities and to crush any rebellion. With the reopening of East Timor, the struggle for independence shifted its focus from the military struggle to the political and diplomatic movement. Carrascalão's dignity and courage in the face of personal hardship, and his selfless commitment to the just cause of his people was evident during his ten years as a governor. It was no use trying to bribe or 'influence' him, for he was quite impervious to such blandishments. This governor launched tough measures to eradicate corruption in the public administration by purging the corruptors (mostly migrants) out of the civil administration. This, to some extent, was a success. Although his performance tended to reinforce already-held prejudices, cynism, and hypocrisy amongst the migrants against the Timorese, Carrascalão 's primary aim was to forge an efficient administration with the capacity to carry out effective government.

When Carrascalão interviewed me and asked my job preference, I quickly said that I would like to work for the Development Planning Board. I knew that the agency was responsible for social and economic planning in the territory, and that it functioned as the Governor's advisory board to execute his decisions concerning development matters. Its basic duties comprised the formulation of the five-year and the annual development documents, estimations of the annual budget, implementation of various research projects concerning both sectoral and regional development issues, project appraisal/ evaluation, and so on. This was all to be done in accordance with Jakarta's guidelines though it was often proclaimed that a 'bottom-up' approach was being pursued. The agency is a key body that seeks to integrate almost all sectors of development. It is a prestigious office in the *pembangunan* system.

I was recommended to report to the *Pak Ketua* [8] of the Board. To my surprise, *Pak Ketua* was an army-appointed official, a Colonel, from BAIS (the powerful intelligence agency which was renamed BIA - *Badan Inteligen* ABRI on 25 January 1994) of Javanese (possibly, *priyayi*) background, who had been there since 1987. But why an army officer? Why a Javanese? I did not really understand at the time. I presumed it was a strategic position that was in the hands of someone who was obedient and loyal to the Suharto regime. A Javanese army official would be the right person to help expand and entrench the 'new imperium'.

This stocky little man with a high-pitched voice was obedient and loyal to his generals in Jakarta and he forced subordinates to behave like him. He did not have any intellectual curiosity and was not interested in exploring an issue, an idea, or a subject because it could threaten 'stability'. He avoided discussions on the region's fundamental issues, such as, immigration, unemployment, resettlement schemes, environmental degradation, family planning programs, foreign aid, and many others, though he was very knowledgeable of such still unresolved issues. When a problematic situation emerged, such as the uncontrollable rates of unemployment caused by massive migration, or project failures due to corruption or mismanagement, he often responded by saying that subordinates must follow the Jakarta's *instruksi*'.

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[8] *Pak Ketua* literally means 'Father/Sir Chief/Director'. *Pak* is the abbreviation of *Bapak* or 'Father/Sir', a predicate that has been employed since the establishment of the New Order in 1966, by replacing the term *Bung* or *Saudara* ('Brother'), which was prevalent during the early decades of Indonesian independence.

This man, like an increasing number of Javanese military personnel had been recruited under the camouflage of *pembangunan* into a prominent position in the East Timor administration. The appointment of this *Pak Ketua* was an example of common practice that perpetuates the army's concept of *dwifungsi*.[9] These Javanese officials often proclaim that they have done more for East Timor in twenty years than the Portuguese did in four and a half centuries. The Timorese are seen as primitives and the Javanese officials think of themselves as superior, with a distinct emphasis on their cultural primacy. The Javanese troops, mostly Muslims, were prepared for a *jihad* against the East Timorese who are Catholics. The most recent signs of a war against the Timorese are, among others, disrespect of sacred places including churches, abuse of nuns, and the construction of new mosques and Muslim schools.

Moreover, the Indonesian government has even forced and encouraged 'migration' into its 'twenty-seventh province' through the so-called Indonesian Transmigration Program (ITP). But such a scheme to resettle Javanese, Maduranese and Balinese people as a means of overcoming demographic and poverty problems, has had an immense impact on the indigenous peoples of East Timor.[10] Local cultural practices are being marginalised by imported Javanese who it is hoped will speed up *pembangunan*. Thus achieving *pembangunan* means becoming more like the Javanese. The results of Indonesian colonialism has been massive migration, huge unmitigated environmental deterioration, unemployment, and the obliteration of our *usos e costumes*. We can see this pattern of maldevelopment leading to the eventual and permanent dislocation of our people, our beliefs, traditions, and dignity.

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[9] *Dwifungsi* or 'Dual Function' is the legitimised intervention of the military in politics, economy, and everyday civil society affairs.

Becoming more like the Javanese means to comply with their bureaucratic norms. In order to become an employee of this Planning Board, I had to complete a fifteen-page questionnaire in the presence of the POLWIL (the Regional Police) officer. This applies to all new employees before their appointments are finalised. The questions range from aspects of one's private life, family/or relatives, to questions related to political attitudes; one question required that the respondent recite the *Pancasila* (the state philosophy) and describe his/her attitude toward it; another item required the respondent to describe the involvement of any member of his/her family in Marxism/Leninism; yet another asked thoughts about political prisoners and their respective families; another item required the respondent to identify the people he/she most admired and the reason for admiring them; other questions required the respondent to provide his/her attitude toward *integrasi* and his/her view of *dwifungsi* (dual function).

Before I started to answer these questions, I was told that the questionnaire was not a survey designed to seek academic answers. I did not have much difficulty in completing the questionnaire because, like everyone else, I had to do *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* or '*Pancasila* Moral Education' at university, as a compulsory subject. This subject is concerned with the national ideology, which is built upon 'national unity' and 'stability'. The subject teaches us reverence for the national leadership, which simply means loyalty to Suharto; therefore opposition of any form is intolerable. As long as one gives correct answers or quotes exactly from the book, that person has made *Pancasila* his/her way of life. Using the same phrases or expressions from the source is not considered plagiarism, rather it reflects a person's level of 'pancasilasation'. I must have given good answers, for shortly afterwards I received a letter from the officer stating that I could work in government departments.

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[10] The impact of migration into East Timor is discussed in Chapter Three.

My academic background did not permit me to deal with construction projects such as, the construction of physical infrastructure. These are the projects that normally cost millions of rupiahs. My particular interests lie in the field of social development, such as the promotion of education, the provision of health and sanitation facilities, the creation of co-operatives, and most importantly the redistribution of the fruits of development to the Timorese people. What I wanted was simple: to help my betrayed people to regain their dignity. Was this dream illusory? Perhaps, but at that time at least amongst my *compatriota*s and colleagues who had just returned home from a tertiary education the vision was not unusual. Returning my people's dignity, I believed, could only be achieved by working with the Indonesian colonial government. I was dissatisfied with things as they were but nevertheless I went along with them in order to secure my end, that is, do something for our betrayed people; I acquiesced because I believed it was to the advantage in the long-run.

# CHAPTER TWO

# MY FIRST DISILLUSIONMENT

## Introduction: Old Buildings, New Symbols, Old Faces, New 'Spies', and Migrants Control Key Positions

My acquiescence in order to achieve or secure a desired end ultimately led to a decline in my confidence in the present government and hence to disillusionment. This chapter is about a sequence of events which took place in the early months of my apprenticeship at the prestigious Planning Board of East Timor. Government practices ranged from attempts to impose alien values and symbols and the enforcement of a top-down approach in development policy, to project management within complicated administrative procedures. All these tasks combined to produce growing disillusionment, uncertainty and volatility amongst those working for the Indonesian government which, since 1975, has struggled to maintain 'national unity' to hold the newly-conquered territory.

Early in the morning, on 2 May 1988, I arrived at the two-storey *Serviços do Fomento* ('development service') building, which was built in the Portuguese era and still stands today (1997). It now functions as the Regional Development Planning

Board of the Indonesian Home Affairs Ministry. I went not to meet *Pak Ketua*, the Director of the Board but to start my first day of work. Although it was 7:45am, the doors were still closed. Normally, the working hours are from 7:30am-2:30pm Mondays-Thursdays, and 7:30am-12:00pm on Fridays and Saturdays. After a while, a few people arrived, some in their uniforms, others in their sport shoes. I greeted them using *Bom Dia* instead of *Selamat Pagi* (which means 'Good Morning') because I thought they were Timorese. Nowadays, *Bom Dia* is consciously used to identify immediately the difference between a *forasteiro*, it is a term which distinguishes between 'them' and 'us'; an 'outsider' or migrant and a native. I started to talk to some of them in *Tetum*, but three of them could not speak the language. They were migrants. I then asked some of the Timorese about what they were doing at the Planning Board and they told me that they were at the lowest rank, cleaners. I quickly realized that local people were, and are, employed in the Board only as 'administration servants'. They worked as drivers, waitresses, and cleaners, and I presumed that the same thing happened in other government departments.

The doors were soon opened and I was invited in to have a look around. Surprisingly, I found most of the rooms in a mess; papers, ink and cigarettes were just left on the marble floor; there were a few desks, old ones, and some typewriters sitting on them. Most of the rooms were dusty and dark because the power had been disconnected. Later, I discovered that this Indonesian Board had delayed the payment of its electricity bills for years, and it was for that reason that power was cut. Luckily, the building was designed in such a way that it did not need much light. I still remember when I first went to this building in 1973 to see my aunty, Auxiliadora. Its marble floor shone and it was impeccably clean and decorated with flowers. No one without shoes was permitted to enter the building.

On almost every wall of each room, there are two big posters of Suharto and Sudharmono, the former Vice-President. In the upper-middle of the posters was the *Garuda*, the Indonesian Coat of Arms; below the two feet of the *Garuda*, was the old Javanese motto, *Bhineka Tunggal Ika*, which means 'Unity in Diversity'. This symbolises the unity of Indonesia's people in spite of their diverse ethnic and cultural origins. *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* was first used by Empu Tantular of the Majapahit Kingdom in the fifteenth century. This Javanese Kingdom, according to Anderson (1993, p. 24), sought to extend its empire to include not only the Timor Island but also other regions, such as, Malaysia and Singapore. Below the posters and the Coat of Arms, there was a green piece of cloth hung up on the wall with the so-called 'five inseparable and mutually qualifying principles' of *Pancasila* crocheted on it in golden ink. The building had also been used by two other departments, namely, Public Works and the Regional Investment Board. Whilst the former has moved to a new building, the latter still occupies half of the building.

I could not do anything before I presented myself to *Pak Ketua*. Presenting oneself to one's superior has now become a common practice in every government administration under this rigidly centralized government, and I was no exception. It was already 8:30am but only a few people were in the building. I was introduced to two people in the Secretary's section who, I remember, worked for the Indonesian

Consulate in Dili before the invasion in 1975. I was quickly finding it less difficult to recognise Indonesians because their manners and language are different from ours. One of them asked whether I was from Jakarta, because they had not seen me in Dili. I answered that I was born and grew up in the city, but had been away for many years in Java. Other colleagues had just arrived. Two of them were brothers and my schoolmates at *Liceu*. Now I did not feel alone. But, I had the feeling that I should curb my tongue while talking to both of them. Both brothers carried a small walkie-talkie. It was the same as those carried by the pro-Indonesia *bufos* ('spies'). *Bufo* was, and is a term employed by Timorese to describe the Indonesian army's informants, who were well trained and paid by the military to denounce anyone suspected of being in the resistance group. Timorese youth, mostly the unemployed and pro-integrationists, have been used by the military to spy on other Timorese. Our conversation ended when the Secretary of the Planning Board arrived.

The Secretary invited me into his room and explained, in general terms, the function of this Board. Again, I was surprised to meet another army officer there; he was a Balinese Lieutnant-Colonel from the infantry division, who was eventually transferred to Bali in 1993. After I introduced myself, he welcomed me to my duties. I asked for a written contract, but he refused to give me one. He told me that we had to ask *petunjuk Bapak* or 'Father's instruction'. The Javanese patron-client system that forces people to call anyone by *Bapak* and *Ibu* instead of *Bung* ('brother' or 'mate'), prevails today. However, this does not only apply to low-ranking personnel in relation to their superiors, governors and ministers also have to *mohon petunjuk* or 'ask for instruction/ guidance' from the President before any decision is to be made.

Having talked with this officer for a few minutes, I noticed that on the wall of his room, besides the two posters of the Coat of Arms and the state ideology *Pancasila*, there was also a carved-stainless steel plate with the following words: *ABRI Manunggal Dengan Rakyat* or 'The Unity of the Armed Forces and People'. These words, which were inscribed by Suharto in the *Yogya Kembali* Monument, embody the Indonesian military's aim to re-activate a series of traditional symbols and values ingrained in the Hindu-Javanese concept of the *ksatria* ('brave warrior' or 'knight'). Not only that, the military continues to maintain firmly that *kemerdekaan* or 'freedom' could not have been achieved without the active role of the military. Its role in politics, including civil administration as *pejuang kemerdekaan* or the 'strugglers of freedom' is, in a sense, a logical consequence of the *perjuangan* or struggle. This function is called *dwifungsi*. Moreover, the *ksatria* concept has been used to cultivate the importance of military discipline and loyalty, and promote a (forced) understanding that there are substantial links between civilians and the military. These words reminded me how hard and risky my career was going to be. I would always be expected to behave in accordance with the new set of rules and manners - like an Indonesian.

Being unable to make decisions, the Secretary went to see the Head of the Board for 'guidance' while I was told to wait in his room. He then told me that *Pak Ketua* wanted to place me in the Social and Cultural Affairs division, one of the five divisions which was located on the second floor. It was in this Division that the two *bufos* worked. In addition to this division, the Planning Board consists of four other divisions and the Secretariat. The Divisions are: (1) Research and Development, (2) Economy, (3) Infrastructure and, (4) Statistics and Report. Each division is divided into four or five sections. The Cultural and Social Affairs division is divided into four sections. These are: (1) Information and Co-operatives; (2) Population; (3) Education, Mental and Spiritual Management; (4) People's Welfare. The first two sections were headed by local people, including one of the two brothers who worked for the Indonesian Intelligence unit. The head of the second section was a Timorese woman. The last two sections were headed by a migrant woman from Molucas, who had spent more than five years in the territory as a member of the Indonesian student regiment or MENWA, its Indonesian acronym. All four sections were operated by one Javanese, two Sulawesi, and one of the *bufos*. The Head of the Division was a West-Javanese Muslim who had been working in East Timor since the late 1970s. There was a significant number of people that immigrated to East Timor and were given jobs in the public sector. These migrants, mostly retired army personnel and factory workers from Java, Bali and Sulawesi, were in no way competent, experienced and motivated people who could generate progress and carry out 'development' programs. They were in East Timor in search of high salaries and quick wealth. In fact, those who work for the Indonesian government in East Timor receive a double salary, called *tunjangan kemahalan*, which is an additional 87% of the salary. This is because East Timor is ranked as the most expensive 'Province', followed by Irian Jaya, in terms of the average consumer price index.[11] Serving for long periods in East Timor they could have learnt our language, and could have become familiar with the customs and traditions of the East Timorese. The Head of this Division welcomed and assigned me to the People's Welfare section. Except for the Head of the Division who worked in a separate room, all four sections were placed in a dusty, 20 metre square room. There were three typewriters, one already broken, and a small filing cabinet used by the sections. That was all that was available in this division, a division that was responsible for the design of 75% of *pembangunan* projects in the region!

The clock struck 10:00am and the room emptied. Everyone had gone for a rest. As a new employee, I preferred to stay in the room trying to figure out the main function of the People's Welfare section. The filing system was so badly organized that I could not find what I wanted; project documents were mixed up with reports and official letters. Half an hour later the Ambonese woman arrived and I asked if she could describe how the section worked. She then explained that the main functions of the People's Welfare section involved planning, monitoring and evaluation of programs related to the welfare of the inhabitants. Programs include, among others, the integrated regional development which was carried out by OPSTER[12] (the Indonesian acronym for *Operasi Teritorial* or Military Operation

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[11] Average consumer prices have not changed much, therefore East Timor remains the most expensive 'province'. See Bappeda dan Statistik (1992a; 1992b, p. 304).

[12] OPSTER has been in East Timor since the late 1980s to carry out government 'development' programs in the villages, by building new resettlement

Territorial), health and sanitation, and so on. Programs are divided into a number of projects, for example, resettlement, water supply, etc., which were under the integrated regional development program. However, she told me that the section was responsible for the planning and monitoring of a single project, that is, 'rehabilitation of widows and orphans as consequences of war'. In fact, the Indonesian government continue to attribute the consequences of war in this part of the world to what they call 'FRETILIN's barbarities'. I did not make any comment as I was aware of the risk. This project, like many others, had been designed by Jakarta and all we had to do was to implement it in accordance with the *petunjuk operasional* ('operational guidelines'); the project involved the distribution of a certain amount of cash money to a certain number of recipients. For example, Jakarta had maintained that there were 33,000 widows and orphans in 1986, a number that did not exceed the number claimed by the pro-independence movement. It should be noted that this figure reflects only a drop in the ocean of the mourning and despair of the thousands of lives left helpless to this date. Predictably, this has been one of the means used by Suharto's New Order state since the late 1970s to downplay the military's atrocious human rights record in the territory, which caused the deaths of tens of thousands of East Timorese, largely civilians.

It was 1:30pm and I felt hungry. I did not have enough money to buy lunch, so I decided to wait for another hour to leave the office. Half an hour before leaving

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areas along the roadside. The involvement of battalions in the OPSTER scheme has been to regain confidence and sympathy and convince the East Timorese that the armed forces, the ABRI, *mencintai rakyat* ('love the people').

time, other workmates began to arrive at the office to sign the absence book. This very relaxed attitude towards working hours has become common in government departments today so that critics have labelled the civil servants in East Timor as 'battalion 702', meaning 'start at seven, produce nothing, and leave at two'. At 2:15pm, the bell rang and we all had to form a line in front of the building for the usual *apel siang* or 'afternoon report'. Though the Planning Board had 52 employees, there were less than 20 people in the line, and most of them were local people including myself, with low-ranking positions. The Secretary acted as the inspector of the *apel* and, we were urged to arrive on time and work with discipline. During the 'report', I was introduced by the Secretary as a new workmate. Normally, the 'report' lasts for about 10 minutes. The Monday-morning 'report', however, usually lasts 40 minutes. The latter consists of a 'national ritual', that is the raising of the Indonesian flag followed by the recitation of the Preamble of 'The 1945 Constitution'. The Preamble has four paragraphs: a condemnation of any form of colonialism in the world; an account of Indonesia's struggle for independence; the declaration of that independence and, a statement of the *Pancasila*. This is immediately followed by the recitation of *Pancasila* and the *Sapta Prasetya Korpri* or the 'Seven Loyalty Principles of Civil Servants'. A speech is delivered by the inspector of the ceremony. This is simply a transmission of the Indonesian *perjuangan kemerdekaan* of 1945. The ceremony is meant to cultivate the *perjuangan,* the spirit of struggle that brought freedom and unity to the country, and 'liberation' to East Timor.

Now I was ready to go home. I walked to Balide where my parents live. On the way home, I noticed groups of armed personnel were on alert on the street corners as if they were prepared to put down any demonstration. It was an impressive scene. In such a inhospitable atmosphere, I hardly saw any *indígenas* apart from some *bufos*. It was quite easy to identify the latter from their walkie-talkies and the way they drove their motorbikes and cars on the streets. In fact, both the army and these agents are known as the *maromak rai-maran*, the *Tetum* expression for 'lords of the earth'. There were a few banners hung up between posts with phrases, such as, *Integrasi adalah pilihanku* or 'Integration is my choice', *Bapak Suharto adalah Bapak Pembangunan* or 'Suharto is the Father of Development'. This was a generous description of a man whose troops have ruthlessly eliminated thousands of lives and destroyed countless villages in East Timor. The town was quiet, not because people were having their *sexta*, but because it was in mourning in response to the devastating effects of the war and occupation. The strong military presence in the cities, towns and villages has prevailed since 1975. Finally, I arrived home; I was tired and confused.

The first two months were something of a struggle. As there was very limited equipment, I often had to borrow a typewriter from other divisions on the first floor to type a single letter. Only from 1990 onwards things began to improve a little; two personal computers were purchased but they were installed in the Secretary's room, and only a Javanese man could use them to type letters. Air conditioning was considered a luxury in a climate where summer temperatures (7 months) regularly reach 31°C inside the building, with the humidity ranging between 50 and 70%. This was combined with the insupportable odour from the open sewers in front of the building, which had formerly been completely covered and regularly cleaned in the Portuguese era. Nowadays, however, sewers are poorly designed and have become channels that carry untreated waste material from homes, workshops and factories.

## The Celebration of *Hari Integrasi*

Two months later, in this desperately under-equipped situation, I found myself along with other workmates, busy with the preparations for the commemoration of 12 years of 'integration'; the 17th of July 1976 was the day when Suharto signed the papers (UU No. 7/1976)[13] on the 'integration' of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia as its '27th Province', it has thus been declared a day of victory by the pro-integrationists. The day has since been annually celebrated in East Timor as *Hari Integrasi* or 'Integration Day'. Though this has nothing to do with the East Timorese struggle for freedom and development, the celebration represents the *ABRI manunggal dengan rakyat* relationship. A series of activities, such as, parades, mass-rallies, competitions, speeches, performances, exhibitions, and so on, is organized for the celebration which involves both the military and civilians. During this time, all groups, political parties and associations march in the streets yelling the regime's slogans: *Sekali bersatu tetap bersatu* or 'Once united and for ever'; *ABRI mencintai rakyat* or 'The Armed Forces love the people'. Usually, these slogans appear on banners hung up on the walls of government buildings, public places, and in the military barracks as an exercise to discourage the masses who worked with the rebels.

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[13] In the Indonesian version, the UU No. 7/1976 on the 'integration' of East Timor, was signed in response to a petition made by the members in the *Pemerintahan Sementara Timor Timur* (the 'Provisional Government of East Timor'), which declared that the East Timorese strongly desired integration. And this was the jusification used by Suharto to sign the papers. A detailed discussion of this façade is found in Dunn (1983, pp. 298-301).

There is always a huge amount of money in the annual budget document for such preparations and every government department has to ensure the money appears on its annual budget for such celebrations. This government-sponsored project indicates the significance of 'integration' day as a safeguard of Indonesia's national interests. The decoration of government buildings for competition is also time consuming because it requires certain criteria for evaluation; for example, cleanliness and ornamental gateways. Most importantly, the slogans, have to appear in every building. The latter is to emphasize the uniformity of expression (*sentimen nasional*) so that there will be no room for non-nationalist sentiments. Government buildings, including the one housing the Planning Board, appear impeccable at least twice a year, that is, on the 17 July and the *tujuhbelasan* or 'seventeenth' (Indonesia Independence Day). Cleanliness is also an important aspect of the government program called *Ketertiban, Kebersihan, Keindahan* or 'Discipline, Cleanliness, and Beauty'. Every single household has to clean its residential area, paint the fence and, most importantly, raise the Indonesian flag in front of the house. Often, people have no way of avoiding this because every family is watched by the *Hansip* or the civil defence unit, and *bufos* who patrol every house.

The celebration of *Hari Integrasi* is followed by a four-week exhibition. The exhibition is open to the public from 9:00am to 10:00pm every day. This time we had to prepare diagrams and statistics, and other graphics to display how far development had progressed in the '27th Province' of Indonesia. The data on display involved infrastructural developments, such as, new roads, schools, health centres and hospitals, power stations, and markets. The most important data that was on display was the amount of money that had been allocated by Jakarta for *pembangunan* in this 'Province'. The allocation of money between 1975 and 1993, for example, was impressive; some A$2.5 billion (approximately A$3,000 for every person currently living in East Timor) was spent on *pembangunan* projects during this period, an amount which could have turned this tiny homeland into a mini-Singapore had it been invested differently. Such incredible sums have always been a weapon to disarm Indonesia's Western critics and maintain its sovereignty over the territory.[14] In fact, less than 50% of the total budget has been invested in East Timor, and the biggest slice is ear-marked for the elites in Jakarta. For example, between 1990 and 1994 there were almost 500 cases of corruption causing a loss of some

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[14] Recently, Sherlock (1996, p. 836) points to the fact that the promotion of 'development' in East Timor by the Indonesian government is simply 'rhetoric for foreign consumption.'

US$150 million out of the development budget.[15] Later, I began to understand that in the case of East Timor, wealth was achieved through corruption, an organized and protected piracy, and that it was not the fruit of hard work. However, corruption and other malpractices were never fully investigated on the eastern half of Timor island although Mário Carrascalão, the former Governor, had dismissed a small number of civil servants for engaging in corruption. Obviously, Suharto has been concerned about the instability that could emerge in the country as a result of such investigations. Carrascalão's decision to send corrupt officials back to Jakarta, disturbed Suharto's policy of not overtly revealing, the wrong-doings of subordinates whom he trusted. Nedless to say, my first two months at the Board were almost a total waste of time, even though it was pleasant enough to get to know more people. It seemed that all the expectations that I had before I commenced my career at this Planning Board would end in disillusionment.

Anyway, the exhibition of the achievements of *pembangunan* was about to start; every government department, various associations, the military, and the representatives for each district were ready with their information stands. Two days before the official opening of the exhibition, my colleagues and I had to memorize the statistics; we were told always to show a happy face and confidence whilst talking to our visitors. The important message was that the Indonesians had come to

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[15] A brief discussion of this discrepancy is provided by Saldanha (1994, pp. 341-345). Saldanha, a pro-integrationist Timorese, made a moderate estimate of an average of 20% that has been corrupted from the total amount of the development budget. From my own observation and work experience in the Planning Board, the level of corruption ranges between 30 and 40% of the total development annual allocations.

'free the Timorese from poverty, a product of Portuguese negligence', and that we are on the path of *'pembangunan ekonomi menuju tinggal landas'* or 'economic development towards take-off'. Conspicuously lacking was the worst impact of their savagery on East Timorese lives. One particular guest, a university student, asked whether the Indonesian Government admitted that there were still more than ninety percent of villagers living below the poverty line in spite of the influx of the huge budget. This visitor did not proceed with the discussion on the matter as it became apparent that it would only put me in a difficult position. This experience revealed that my colleagues and I must repeat the same claim made by the Javanese, who regard themselves as an instrument of civilization. In their view, without Indonesia, East Timor had no chance to progress and that progress was measured in quantitative terms only. I had to be prepared for the masquerade, anyway. I knew that the statistics indicated significant increments in physical infrastructure, but they did not reveal the level of poverty, the small number of beneficiaries of development, and the limits on access to such infrastructures.

## An Endless *Extravagância*: The Revival of *the Revolusi 1945*

While the 'development' achievements had been proclaimed as a logical consequence of *integrasi*, the celebration of the *tujuhbelasan* had been instigated to incorporate the East Timorese into the *revolusi* Indonesia against Dutch colonialism.

The *tujuhbelasan* was intended to distort and dismantle the East Timorese growing 'nationalism' and 'consciousness' for self-determination. This time that is, one month after the 'Integration Day', my colleagues and I were again kept busy for the commemoration of the *tujuhbelasan*. Usually, the celebration consisted of three stages: the preparations and competitions that took place two weeks before the 17 August; the ceremony in the square in front of the Governor's office and the entertainment, exhibition and distribution of prizes which lasted a week.

Preparations for the Indonesian 'national day' were exhaustive; they included painting of government buildings and fences, the cleaning of the streets, and the decoration of buildings. Here, the transplanting of an alien culture in the name of *kesadaran nasional* or a 'national consciousness', is reflected in the decoration of these buildings. For example, there must be a Javanese-typed arc, called *gapura*, made of wood or bamboo at the main entrance gate(s), with *17 Agustus* on the left side of the arc and *1945* on the other, and on the crossbar must appear the words: *Dirgahayu HUT Kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia*. The Indonesian flag is raised around the fence. This time the slogans, which have been used by Suharto's *lacaios* ('valets') to show support for his regime, were a bit different from the previous ones. They were, among others, *Bersama ABRI marilah kita mengisi kemerdekaan kita* or 'Together with the Armed Forces, we give substance to our independence'. The army once again became the centre of the exhibition because of its role in maintaining stability in the country. Other slogans, such as, *Dengan jiwa dan semangat kemerdekaan 1945, kita menyongong Pelita V* or 'With our soul and spirit of freedom of 1945, let's promote the Fifth Five-Year Plan', sought to direct people to become nostalgic for the past and to be submerged in the remembrance of the 1945 period which led up to independence.

The continuing revival of the *spirit of 1945* is thus intended to strengthen Indonesians' will to protect their independence. To the East Timorese, this was seen as a mechanism used to immobilize the Timorese who saw their homeland as an object of continuing exploitation by the settlers, so that the elites may carry out their mission peacefully. However, this form of exploitation encourages local resistance. I will emphasize this particular point in the following two chapters.

Slogans that carry messages, such as, *Marilah kita sukseskan Program Keluarga Berencana* or 'Let's successfully implement the Family Planning Program', has been opposed and criticized by the local Catholic Church as being 'illicit and illegal'. The Indonesian family planning program is, in a sense, a racist one for it tries to curb growth rates in the region but at the same time it encourages 'outsiders' or migrants to settle in less populated regions, like East Timor. The Catholic Church has predictably received wide support from the lay people who continue to struggle for their survival in response to massive migration from other islands such as Java, Bali, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara. However, it has been difficult for the Church to prevent its members from being forcibly submitted to 'chemical sterilization'. In fact, the widespread use of *Depo-Provera* on 66% of Timorese women ('acceptors') in the early 1990s (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, p. 108), remains today a strategy used by the Indonesian government to control (and reduce) fertility rates in East Timor.[16] All these have now become the standardized model in such superfluities or *extravagância*, a model that always seeks to 'assimilate and unify' the Timorese cultural mosaic in a single way of life, that of the Javanese. The latter have been regarded as the 'true' Indonesians by the present regime. Not only that, Jakarta's *keluarga berencana* was designed to 'liquidate' the East Timorese population and turn the remnants (pro-integrationists) into 'true' Indonesians.

Immediately following such absorbing preparations, we had to be prepared for the competitions, which involved speeches, cooking, handicrafts, and the long-march. Each government department, the military, and other sections of society was represented by a contingent of about twenty members. The march starts in front of the Governor's office and covers approximately 10 kilometres, finishing at the starting place. The best contingent is the one which not only arrives first at the finishing line, but has also shown discipline and style. This was difficult to achieve because not all the members of a contingent share the same speed and style. In the afternoon, there are a series of sports. Though the term 'competition' is used, games among government departments emphasise *nilai kebersamaan* or 'mutuality', and they are more political events than *desportivo*; such games are always preceded by a long and dull speech that stresses the *perjuangan 1945* spirit. I was not impressed with the way the games were performed nor was I interested in the 'competitions'. But marching 10 kilometres on a hot and sultry day in August with temperatures averaging 35°C, is not an easy task and hence I was impressed by the efforts of those involved.

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[16] Another source reveals that in the villages, 'many women are injected with Depo Provera without knowing what it is. Women have been sterilised when they come to the clinic for something else ... they are told that it's okay by the babinsas' (Pilger 1994, p. 285). In line with this, Hughes (1995, p. 1) reporting on a the story of a volunteer health worker, Simon de Faux, said that Timorese prefered to go to underequipped church clinics rather than use Indonesian health centres for 'better care' and because of their 'suspicion of anything associated with the Indonesian authorities.'

On the night of the 17th of August, the heads of various government departments and bureaus, including their families, community and religious leaders, and representatives of each division of the armed forces were invited for a reception at the Governor's palace. I was able to enter the palace because I had to accompany my mother, who was invited as one of the religious leaders. The Governor opened the reception with a fifteen-minute speech followed by speeches from the military Commander and then dinner. Although soup was available, the reception did not start with it. The Governor began the dinner by cutting the top of *nasi tumpeng*, a cone-shaped dish made of spicy rice and decorated with vegetables. The dish is central to Javanese ceremonies for it represents a mountain where spirits abide. Also, all the visitors had to appear in *batik*, a symbol of the Javanese tradition that has become Indonesia's *pakaian nasional* ('national dress') which one has to wear at official meetings and ceremonies like this. During dinner, one of the East Timorese bands played music, ranging from Jakarta's top hits to Jawa's *Dandut* and East Timor's *Koremetan*. The reception ended at 10 o'clock and everyone was prepared to leave the palace. The situation outside the palace appeared calm due to dozens of military personnel who seemed prepared to respond to any activity from the guerillas who during previous receptions have attacked the palace.

## 'Development' Policy: Top-Down Approach 1988-1990

Two months following the *tujuhbelasan*, I was instructed by *Pak Ketua* to comment on a draft document on the policies and programs for the *pembangunan* of the region over the next five years. The draft was proposed by the *Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana*, where I studied. A team of academics from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds from this university was formed to conduct surveys and design the *Pola Dasar Pembangunan* or the 'Fundamental Model of Development' and the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan of East Timor. While the former was a highly abstract document which contained ideological and philosophical formulations, the latter was more practical and contained the rationale, strategies, programs, and budget estimations for each program during the course of five years. In East Timor a counterpart team was formed which consisted of the military as the key player, and government officials representing the twelve development sectors. I was included in the team as well. But neither the existing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) nor the Catholic Church were involved in the design process. Prior to the commencement of the activities, the team from *Satya Wacana* was carefully selected by the BIA (the 'Indonesian Armed Forces Intelligence Bureau'). After the selection, one member was excluded from the list; he was among the most prominent scholars at the university, namely, Dr. Arief Budiman. The reason for his exclusion was obvious; his name, according to the Intelligence Board, was on a *persona non grata* list, and his involvement in the project would certainly jeopardize Jakarta's policy to crush all opposition in East Timor. In addition Budiman's involvement might unveil malpractices and mismanagement in the region. The elimination of this expert led to the inclusion of 'low profile' and complacent members, a strategy that suited Jakarta's own political interests. This had a significant impact on the outcome of the Plan. In effect, both teams had to stick to the policies advocated by Jakarta as stipulated in the *petunjuk dasar* ('basic guidelines'). The *petunjuk* contains standardized phrases and expressions, which must appear in both policy documents, the 'Model' and the 'Plan'. Again, repeating similar phrases and expressions was not considered plagiarism; rather it was intended to assure that the 'development' in East Timor was in line with the *pembangunan nasional.*

According to the 'guidelines', it was necessary to obtain information concerning social and economic details of the inhabitants in order that planners were able to produce sound policy documents. Thus an initial survey was carried out prior to the design of both the 'Model' and 'Plan' documents. But the survey was almost a farce. The team visited the districts and stayed only three days in each district hoping to get thorough data. Although I was a member of the counterpart team, the interviews were carried out by the *Satya Wacana* group. Often, I functioned as driver, guide, and interpreter for the group when language problems arose. We interviewed key government officials who represented the parliament and the executive chamber. These included *Bupatis*, the district heads. While some members of the team interviewed these officials, others interviewed the *Babinsas* and *Binpoldas*,[17] the people responsible for the 'guidance' of villages.[18] By the time the survey was conducted, the majority of the posts were already in the hands of non-East Timorese. The result of the survey was a fabrication. For example, some interviewees had even stated that the history of East Timor began after the 1975 invasion, and that the past was an era of backwardness and superstition. They stated that, because the East Timorese still lived in the past, 'development' programs were difficult to implement in the region. It was therefore necessary to submerge and crush our past and replace it with a 'modern' uniformed life-style and culture, that of the Javanese. What a judgement! Others showed some knowledge about the culture, customs and traditions of the *indígenas* but then they ended the interview by saying *'kita adalah sama'* ('we are the same'), as if the East Timorese did not have their own cultural integrity and uniqueness.

Prior to the implementation of the integrated regional development project which was carried out by OPSTER, I was appointed, without consultation, by the Deputy Governor, a Javanese Brigadier-General, as the treasurer of the project. I refused the task on the basis that I was busy and that I had no previous experience in dealing with such a large amount of money. I was not willing to work with the military because I had had a dreadful experience in Liquiça, where a gun had been pointed at me in a minor argument.[19] Obviously, this refusal infuriated *Pak Ketua* who accused me of ingratitude and rebellion against *keputusan pemerintah* (a 'government decision'). I was subsequently transferred from the planning division, which mostly deals with projects, to the research and development division, which is regarded as a place where one's career stagnates. Here I was given two tasks: to issue *surat izin* ('permission') to everyone who wanted to conduct any research in East Timor and chair the Commission for the *Neraca Kependudukkan dan Lingungan Daerah* ('the Regional Population and Environmental Balance'). The latter position involved the production of a three-hundred page 'balance sheet' document on the population-environment interaction. Unfortunately, this document was never used by policy makers on the Planning Board as a basis for the formulation of *pembangunan* projects even though it provided information on the level of environmental degradation that resulted from the construction projects.

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[17] Both the *Babinsa* or 'Village-Guidance Official' representing the ABRI, and the *Binpolda* or 'Village-Police Official' representing the police force, constitute the cornerstone of the *sistem pemerintahan desa* ('village management system')

[18] Administratively, East Timor is divided into 442 *desas* ('villages'), 62 *kecamatans* ('sub-districts') and 13 *kabupatens* ('districts').

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[19] Liquiça, one of the districts, lying 25 kilometres west off Dili, was a site of the Satya Wacana Christian University's community development project, where East Timorese students, including myself, worked as volunteers. The project commenced in 1987 and today it is a training centre for community development candidates, specialising in low-land agriculture. It was in 1987 that I first got involved in community development programs such as, sanitation, water supply, co-operatives, and the like, under Satya Wacana's sponsorship. Between Dili and Liquiça, there were a number of military posts that always asked for surat jalan or 'travel permit' from anyone who left and entered Dili. Very often the Indonesian troops asked silly questions that one day made me nervous. And it was enough to infuriate a low-ranking, Javanese, soldier.

## Managing a Bilateral Project Within a Complicated Bureaucracy 1990-1992

Having a reasonable command of English led me to more difficult but exciting tasks. I was now appointed by the Governor to manage the East Timor Water Supply and Sanitation Project (ETWSS). I worked for the project for about two years and resigned from it after I obtained an AusAID (Australia Agency for International Development) scholarship. ETWSS, a bilateral project, which was carried out under the auspices of both the Australian and Indonesian governments.

More than 80% out of the total budget of the project originated from Australia, which was in the form of a grant. Although it could be argued that the grant was provided in the context of Paul Keating's consistent support for Suharto's dogmatic, uncompromising and oppressive regime, the project brought about significant improvements in the area of water supply and sanitation in the towns of Dili and Covalima, the latter being one of the *kabupatens*, on the south coast of the island.

Initial research and assessments were made prior to the implementation of the project. The findings showed formidable discrepancies: only a small amount of money out of approximately A$19 million had been invested in the construction and rehabilitation of water supply facilities in Dili. Such a huge amount of money, as it appeared in the project documents, was designed to serve the population of Dili, consisting of 135,000 people. It was ironic that in Dili, out of a relatively small number of people, only 10% had access to water supply facilities despite billions of rupiahs that had been invested since the early 1980s. Moreover, the beneficiaries were the military who camped along the transmission pipelines and the high-ranking officials who occupied ex-Portuguese houses. The rest of the population had to walk some 2-3 kilometres to find water for their daily consumption. It could be argued that corruption and mismanagement were the causes of such discrepancies. Thus, the aim of the ETWSS was to construct new facilities and rehabilitate the existing water supply and sanitation infrastructure in the two towns. Besides the physical construction, the project was intended to assist local government departments responsible for water supply and sanitation, and to strengthen the institutional base to ensure sustainability of the project. Institutional strengthening involved the improvement of planning and development skills and the creation of a data base for water supply and sanitation infrastructure, elements that were relatively non-existent prior to the design of the project.

The project was carried out at a multi-sector base, involving public works, health, and home affairs departments. It was difficult to work with such a project because over the years the Indonesian Government has developed rather complex hierarchial bureaucratic systems both at national and regional levels, and Indonesia's '27th Province' was no exception. Initially, the project was expected to be finalised within a period of five years, but it had to be extended due to the complexity of bureaucracy and security problems. The bureaucracy is further complicated by the existence of two essentially parallel sectoral agencies operating in the region, the KANWILS (the Indonesian acronym for *Kantor Wilayah* or 'Regional Offices'), which are central line agencies and dependent on Jakarta, and the *Dinas* (or 'Government Agency/Service'), which are provincial. Although the Indonesian Government, through its regulation PP No. 6 of 1988, has devolved greater authority to the governor to organise and co-ordinate these agencies in order to achieve greater cohesion in planning and development, the KANWILS remain loyal to the central ministries. Thus the project's aim to strengthen the system of planning at provincial and *kabupaten* levels, needed to cut across several traditional boundaries and jurisdiction. This further complicated the planning and co-ordinating processes and the prospect for an efficient and effective project.

The complexity of the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction resulted in the risk of losing financial resources, and posed a threat to the project. Almost ninety percent of the total budget (approximately, A$12 million) came from Australia, while Indonesia contributed 10-13% and East Timor provided less than 2%. Consequently, the project was largely governed by the policies and procedures involved in the allocation of finances designed by Jakarta. Although East Timor had a five-year plan, which included the implementation of water supply and sanitation projects in the region, the ETWSS was reviewed several times by the central government in Jakarta, and needed approval before funding was released. The 2% of East Timorese financial contribution, over which there was greater autonomy of use, was not sufficient to keep the project going during delays caused by the central review system. A centralised bureaucracy has been a form of subordinating East Timor to Jakarta's own 'development' schemes, a form which is also evident in other

Indonesian provinces. The centralised bureaucracy with its complicated procedures has been designed not only to contain the strengthening of bureaucracies in the periphery but also to impose a structure of control over Indonesia's colonies. The structure of control once in place, can preserve the channels used by vested interest groups which always seek opportunities out of such construction projects.

The creation of a highly centralised administration, in terms of both financial and policy making aspects, has not only effectively created greater dependency at the local level upon Jakarta's subsidies, but has also prevented the concentration of power at the 'provincial' level. The latter has long become an issue that most elites (who have been reluctant to let power shift from the centre in Jakarta) try to avoid. This in effect perpetuates Jakarta's penetration into regional affairs and is a characteristic of the New Order state. The 'provincial' lack of autonomy has therefore become a more political matter than simply an administrative one. In the view of the elites, decentralising financial and policy making could mean a step towards political disintegration. In terms of the interests of the elites, 'national integration' can only be maintained through the control of all government's financial resources extracted from the 'provinces' and through the exploitation of the 'advantages' that the 'provinces' offer, such as the lack of managerial and professional people. This form of exploitation has similarly been exercised in other Indonesian provinces. The means employed by the Java-centred New Order can be viewed as a mix of various strategies ranging from designing top-down projects, recruiting staff and dictating policies through to the creation of more complicated administrative procedures. Thus, *pembangunan*, which emphasizes material progress and is carried out through projects, has become Jakarta's vehicle to expand and assert control over the peoples' affairs in the regions. As Ariel Heryanto has commented, *pembangunan* 'became the means of legitimation for the New Order as it demonstrated the ability of the central government to bring material benefits to its subjects' (as quoted in Guinness 1994, p. 269).

# CHAPTER THREE

# *PEMBANGUNAN*: RAVAGING THE FACE OF EAST TIMOR

## *Pembangunan*: A Groundless Monument

When the Indonesians invaded East Timor, they affirmed that their soldiers had been 'invited' by us to 'restore order', a condition necessary to carry out 'development' programs. The soldiers, mainly Javanese, came and proclaimed themselves as 'liberators' and 'peacekeepers'. They put forward economic doctrines such as rapid growth, to disarm demands for freedom. *Pembangunan*, is what the Indonesians called it. The word has become very popular; it has filled up the East Timor's local newspaper, *Suara Timor Timur*. Even today the newly-elected heads of villages use the word on various occasions in their villages. The word is also sometimes used in speeches during wedding ceremonies. It appeared to promise something Timorese thought they had been without for more than four centuries. Ironically, this conquering nation, that itself still suffered from serious underdevelopment,[20] promised to solve the East Timorese problems. Poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness, were regarded as direct results of Portuguese colonialism and the civil war of the mid-1970s. Today the Indonesians insist that what they have done for East Timor goes far beyond anything that the Portuguese did in more than four centuries. In fact, there have been impressive achievements since 1975: the construction of 2,500 kilometres of new roads, with some 700 kilometres already asphalted; the doctor-patient ratio has decreased from 1:25,000 in the early 1970s to 1:5,000 in 1990; there are now 579 elementary schools, 71 high schools, of which 24 are run by the Catholic missions, one new polytechnic, and much more. Moreover, the growth rate of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was almost 6% per annum between 1983 and 1986, or about 50% faster than Indonesia's growth rate. In 1990 East Timor's economy grew at 11.64%, this figure was higher than the growth rate of Indonesia's GDP which was 7.37% in the same period.[21]

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[20] The following figures will sufice to indicate that Indonesia is still placed 105th in terms of the HDI (Human Development Index), in spite of the New Order's

These figures present a picture of *pembangunan* as the Indonesian would like to see it. The figures, however, mask the real situation for most East Timorese. For the indigenous peoples of East Timor, *pembangunan* has another face. The dramatic improvements in terms of the economy and infrastructure have not brought about

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proclaimed economic 'success'. For example, out of 191.2 million people in 1992, there were some 48% of people who were still living in absolute poverty. In the same year, there were 94.2 million and 106.7 million people who lived without access to safe water and sanitation, respectively. Some 8.7 million children under five were malnourished in 1992. The Indonesia's GNP (Gross National Product) per capita was US$270 lower than the average for all devloping countries, that was, US$610, and so on. These figures combined, resulted in an index of 0.586 at the HDI standards. For more details on HDI for Indonesia, see (UNDP 1994, pp. 130, 134, 136, 174).

[21] These estimations are based on Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, pp. 52-60, 94-99, 220.

major structural changes as agriculture continues to represent about 50% of GDP. Moreover, despite improvements in the economy and infrastructure as indicated by the figures above, such improvements do not reflect the real picture for East Timorese. In fact it is the migrants and not the *indígenas* who have benefitted and who represent these improvements. East Timor has the lowest GDP per capita as a result of high living costs (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992a, p. 14). Until the mid-1990s, East Timor appeared to be among the highest in Indonesia in terms of the KFM (the Indonesian acronym for *Kebutuhan Fisik Miminum* of 'Minimum Physical Needs Index').[22] In 1990, the Minimum Physical Index for a couple with three children in East Timor was Rp 265,608, whereas in Jakarta the Index was Rp. 175,348. This means that in East Timor the average value and Index of Minimum Physical Needs for a worker and family with three children for a month was Rp 90,260 lower than the average for Indonesia. If we relate the Index to the real GDP per capita which in East Timor was Rp. 180,727 and >Rp 1.2 million for Jakarta, that means the majority of East Timorese live with a constant deficit of -Rp 7,073 per month. In other words, the cost of living remains at higher rates than wages and salaries and hence, the majority of the population continues to face a lower standard of living. The growth rate of the real per capita GDP remained low, that is, 4.54% between 1983-1990 because of high population growth rates[23] as a result of massive immigration. The low income per capita in East Timor has had significant impact on the per capita consumption of proteins. The per capita consumption of meat in East Timor was 1.3 Kg per year in 1990, whereas the average Indonesian consumed 8.1 Kg per year; with regard to the per capita consumption of eggs, East Timor registered only 0.2 Kg per year, whereas the average Indonesian consumed 2.2 Kg per capita per year in 1990 and for the per capita consumption of fish, East Timor consumed 0.8 Kg per year, whereas Indonesia consumed 12.5 Kg per capita per year in 1990 (Bappeda dan Statistik 1991, p. 14). As a consequence of low per capita income which forced the majority to eat less calories and proteins, there has been an increase in Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) from 60/1000 in the early 1970s to 106/1000 in the late 1980s (Saldanha 1994, pp. 273-275). Moreover, with regard to the level of formal education of a population of 747,557 in 1990, 12.84% of the population never attended school, 62% did not finish elementary school, 12.11% completed primary school, 4% studied at junior high school, 1.5% completed high school and 0.15% attended tertiary education (Bappeda 1991, p. 47). These figures indicate that in two decades of Suharto's rule of East Timor his *pembangunan* strategy had only produced a richer minority (mostly migrants) in a deprived colony. The more the funds are poured into East Timor for its 'development' program, the higher the number of migrants who benefit from such impressive amounts of money.

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[22] The KFM of the 'Minimum Physical Needs Index' has been used by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics to measure different levels of cost of living across regions.

[23] For the per capita income see (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, pp. 304-305; 1992a, p. 19).

## The Impact of *Pembangunan*: Demographic Changes and Poverty

Whilst *pembangunan* has occurred in the interests of migrants, for the East Timorese *pembangunan* has perpetuated a new form of colonialism through the reconfiguration of the landscape and its peoples. For the last fifteen years, the population of East Timor has grown at an accelerated pace. Table 1 shows that the number of people has more than doubled since the Indonesian invasion and occupation from 555,350 in 1980 to 871,707 in 1995 (Kantor Statistik 1991, p. 7). This means that more than two million people will be added to the present East Timor population of 871,707 in five year's time due to massive 'migration' into the region. Assuming that the population is still growing at 3.02% per year, the population of East Timor will double within 23 years and quadruple within 46 years.

**Table 1**: *East Timor Demographic Profile, 1948-2000*

| Year | Population | r | d | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1948[a] | 420,430 | -0.3 | 28 | 1927-1948 |
| 1960[a] | 517,079 | 1.7 | 35 | 1948-1960 |
| 1970[a] | 609,477 | 1.7 | 41 | 1960-1970 |
| 1980[b] | 555,350 | n.a. | 38 | 1970-1980 |
| 1995[b] | 871,707 | 3.02 | 60 | 1980-1995 |
| 2000[c] | 2,922,137 | 3.02 | 200 | 1995-2000 |

*Legend*:
r → annual population growth rate (%)
n.a.→ No data available, but the growth rate was said to be negative
d → density (people per sq km)
a → Soesastro (1991, p. 210)

b → Kantor Statistik (1991, p. 10)

c → The exponential formulae[24] used as a method of prediction, is:

$$P_t = P_o e^{at + \frac{bt^2}{2}}$$

where $P_o$ = Population at the beginning of the time period being considered.

$P_t$ = Population after 't' years.

'e' = is a mathematical expression of natural growth.

'a' represents the growth rate per year at time t=0.

'b' a factor that adjusts 'a' over time (Newman 1995, p. xvi).

The table also shows significant fluctuations at certain periods of time. For example, there was a negative growth rate between the 1927-1948 period due to the Second World War, but afterwards, the growth rate became more stable, that is, 1.7% during the 1948-1970 period. Assuming a constant growth rate of 1.7% per year, the population of East Timor should have been around 780,000 in 1980. However, the Indonesian 1980 Census recorded a population of 555,350 in 1980, suggesting a discrepancy of 224,650 people. The Indonesian invasion of East Timor and subsequent annexation has resulted in the most appalling brutalities and the loss of more than 200,000 lives, at the hands of Indonesian troops (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, p. 51; Taylor 1991, pp. 71, 90, 208). This helps to explain the discrepancy.

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[24] The 'exponential' approach is used to calculate the population growth rates in East Timor based on the assumption that the growth occurs continuously.

However, the population of East Timor increased to 871,707 in 1995 with an average growth rate of 3.02% per year. The growth rates of East Timor on the fragile coastal fringe area are primarily due to immigration rather than the natural increase component. As a matter of fact, more than 300,000 Indonesian 'migrants' from Java, Bali, Madura, Macassar, and other outer islands have settled in East Timor. Most of these 'migrants' occupy bureaucratic positions in the capital city of Dili, and the rest are farmers who took over the lands of the Timorese. This figure does not include the 14 armed battalions (each battalion comprises more than 700 soldiers) which are normally accompanied by their respective families and/or relatives. Also, unofficial migrants outnumber official ones.

This demographic change is important from several viewpoints. First, the dramatic increase of the East Timor population since the 1980s is primarily due to massive migration into the country. One of the results of this increase is the re-shaping of the existing landscape such as the enlargement of cities. Secondly, it is evident that the increase of population growth rates has its own impact over its surrounding region and environment. Table 2 shows that the concentration patterns of population have significantly altered the patterns of population growth in Dili, the capital city of East Timor. As can be seen from Table 2, the population density of Dili has increased dramatically since 1980. This fragile coastal fringe of only 372 square kilometres was inhabited by more than 150,000 people in 1980 increasing the density from 182 people per square kilometre to approximately 449 people per square kilometre in 1995 (Kantor Statistik 1991, pp. 1, 10). If population density is related to the land use pattern, where Dili has only 22.7 square kilometres suitable for settlement, then the current density level is more than 6,000 people per square kilometre. This figure exceeds that of Singapore (4,332 people/sq kilometre) or Hong Kong (5,429 people/sq kilometre) in 1990 (ADB 1993, p. 4).

**Table 2**: *Population Growth Pattern in Dili, 1980-1995*

| District/ Region | Area sq Km | r | d | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1980 | 1985 | 1995 |
| Dili | 372 | 6.28 | 182 | 248 | 449 |
| East Timor | 14,609 | 3.02 | 38 | 44 | 60 |

Source: Compilation of (Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 47; Kantor Statistik 1991, pp. 1, 4, 10)

*Legend*: r → annual growth rate (%) based on the 1980-90 period

d → density (number of people per square kilometre)

This massive migration leading to high population growth rates has resulted in serious environmental problems in terms of the physical and non-physical aspects. The influx of migrants, either through the spontaneous/ encouraged or government-sponsored *transmigrasi* has become a process of colonisation through land and resource appropriation. The 'transmigrants' are located in fertile lands which Timorese have used for growing rice or making gardens (*to'os*). Examples of this can be found in the districts of Covalima, Manufahi, Bobonaro, Baucau, Ermera and Liquiça which represent the areas with population growth rates above 3% annually. The districts have become the sites of the *transmigrasi* scheme. Not only has *transmigrasi* led to dispossession and deprivation of the indigenous peoples of East Timor, but sending migrants into the territory has also become a political strategy used by Suharto's New Order state which seeks to 'assimilate and unify the varying cultures of Indonesia into a single way of life, that of the Javanese, who have been regarded and treated as the "true' Indonesians' by the present regime (Skephi and Monroe 1993, pp. 246-247).

The presence of migrants, mainly Javanese, in East Timor is reflected in the architectural style. For example, a program called *bedol deso* is aimed at transposing a 'typical Javanese village package' onto the island, thus creating Javanese-style villages all over East Timor. Such an approach has created social and cultural tensions over resources and land in the host country which often leads to physical conflicts.

This approach has also caused psychological pressures on the Timorese, particularly those who live close to the transmigration areas and who work in government offices. The migrants declare themselves as superior and essential to East Timor's overall 'development'. For example, the heads of government offices often pronounce in their official speeches that without the migrants, East Timor has no chance to progress. The officials claim that the Javanese work ethic is superior, particularly in their agricultural methods, therefore they should be emulated by the Timorese.

A number of identifiable features, both of 'migrant' flows and of the regions into which people move, has influenced the likelihood of accelerated environmental change in the fringe areas. A review of available literature provides some evidence of environmental degradation in 'migrant'-affected areas, although the reliability of this evidence varies considerably. Environmental problems have been identified, in particular, in five main regions that have absorbed the largest totals of 'migrants' since the 1980s, namely, Dili, Ermera, Aileu, Covalima, and Liquiça. Table 3 indicates the areas that absorb most migrants. As indicated in the Table, Dili had the highest population growth rate, 6.28% per year during the 1980-90 period, followed by Aileu (4.98%), Liquiça (4.19%), Covalima (3.32%), and Ermera (3.30%). The population growth rates in these areas are above East Timor's average level, 3.02% per year during the 1980-90 period.

**Table 3**: *Population Growth Patterns in Selected Areas, 1980-95*

| District/ Region | Area Sq. Km | r | d | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1980 | 1985 | 1995 |
| Covalima | 1,226 | 3.32 | 21 | 26 | 43 |
| Aileu | 729 | 4.98 | 21 | 27 | 43 |
| Liquiça | 548 | 4.19 | 54 | 64 | 99 |
| Ermera | 746 | 3.30 | 76 | 89 | 122 |
| Dili | 372 | 6.28 | 182 | 248 | 449 |
| East Timor | 14,609 | 3.02 | 38 | 44 | 60 |

Source: Compiled from (Kantor Statistik 1991, pp. 1, 4, 10)

*Legend*: r → annual population growth rate (%) during the 1980-90 period
d → number of people per square kilometre

Given the high population growth rates in those fragile areas, three particular types of human-induced accelerated environmental change can be identified which are of potential long-term importance, namely deforestation, land degradation and pressure on the water supply, the latter includes both depletion of available reservoirs and water pollution.

Evidence of deforestation is cited in a range of studies of the 'transmigration' areas. For example, George Aditjondro (1994, p. 60) noted visual evidence of the total destruction of sandalwood, one of East Timor's strategic commodities, leading to a dramatic decline in production and export. For example, the production of sandalwood recorded in 1987 was 320 tons, but plummeted to 11 tons in 1991. This has resulted in a decline in the export of sandalwood oil and powder (see Table 4). The figures do not include the massive destruction of sandalwood in the early 1980s by army personnel. Obviously, the destruction of sandal trees significantly affected East Timor's fragile economy.

**Table 4**: *Production and Export of Sandalwood in East Timor, 1987-1991*

(in tons)

| Product | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production | | | | | |
| Sandalwood | 320 | 150 | 176 | 57 | 11 |
| Sandalwood Oil | 7 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Sandalwood Powder | 198 | 136 | 34 | 77 | n.a |
| Export | | | | | |
| Sandalwood Oil | 2.3 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 1.8 | n.a |
| Sandalwood Powder | 109.7 | 200.4 | 75 | 57 | n.a |

Source: (Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 208)

*Legend*: n.a. → no data available

Deforestation has also occurred in the so-called *transmigrasi* areas used for agriculture and cattle ranching. Table 5 shows that annual deforestation has intensified since the 1980s. The cumulative area deforested in just five years time has reached 14,087 hectares or increased 2.98% of a total forest area of 472,877 hectares.

**Table 5**: *Area Deforested (Burning) Yearly in East Timor, 1989-1993*

(in hectares)

| Area | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | 29 | n.a. | 5630 | n.a. | n.a. |
| South | 925 | 1036 | 2622 | n.a. | n.a. |
| East Timor | 954 | 1036 | 8252 | 402 | 3443 |

Source: (Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 208).

*Legend*: n.a. → no data available

It is important to note that the figures have not included the level of deforestation as a result of incineration for military surveillance both in the early years of the invasion and since the Dili Massacre. Vast areas of formerly natural rainforest have been cleared and badly damaged for better military control of guerillas, leaving these areas at risk. The native Timorese have been displaced from their homelands, to unfamiliar and fragile environments. Moreover, many families were moved on three or more times during resettlement, each move causing yet more rainforest clearance. Shifting cultivation (or swiddening) represents another situation wherein people forcibly move from site to site, clearing tracts of land, because prevailing ecological conditions do not support permanent forms of subsistence agriculture. Soils are often leached beyond repair, thus preventing any subsequent natural regeneration of forest. Because of thin, infertile soils, yields decline sharply after a couple of years of cultivation forcing swiddeners to move to another location, leaving their land to lie fallow for up to twenty years before it can be cultivated again. It can be said that, the appropriation and destruction of land by the military through the resettlement strategy have forced Timorese to become shifting cultivators.

Moreover, land degradation in East Timor has received relatively less attention by the Indonesian bureaucratic machinery. This partly reflects the fact that little or no evidence is available to indicate that land degradation is a serious problem in deforested areas, although the potential for such degradation is real. It is presumably unlikely that Indonesians will admit that their practices are harmful. Although some studies have been conducted in the country mentioning land degradation as a problem in coastal areas such as Dili, Manatuto, Liquiça, and Covalima, evidence is rarely available in the form of a detailed study of environmental processes. Thus, in East Timor, 'severe' soil erosion, plus a breakdown of soil ecology and nutrient cycling have occurred due to frequent deforestation linked to the presence of 'migrants' and the military.

Although relatively little and unreliable quantitative evidence exists of the scale of land degradation in 'migrant'-affected areas, it is nonetheless possible to draw a preliminary conclusion of the risk of such degradation.

From Table 3, it can be seen that the majority of long-term 'migration' flows are now concentrated in fragile coastal areas such as Dili where there is limited access to agricultural land. According to land use patterns, only 25.6 square kilometres or 6.89% of the total land of Dili is suitable for growing maize and tubers (Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 11). This situation becomes more complicated with major flows of shifting cultivators who were forced to leave their fertile homelands to exploit the devastated lands surrounding the capital, Dili. As a matter of fact, the treeless mountains surrounding Dili form a critical area of approximately 15,000 hectares. These mountains were formerly covered by a great variety of trees such as *Eucalyptus Sp., Aquilaria Sp., Tamarindus indica, Maorosa,* and other native tress that have disappeared since the 1980s due to frequent burning and cutting. As a result, the levels of soil erosion are currently medium to high lowering the current and/ or future capacity to support human life.

Another area of environmental degradation potentially associated with a massive influx of 'migrants' into an area concerns pressures on the supply of water. The dramatic increase of Dili population (6.28% per year in the 1980-90 period), has increased demands on the water supply creating water shortages for both host populations (the native Timorese) and the 'migrants'. For example, Dili's maximum capacity of water production is 110 L/S which is currently supplied by two intermittent rivers and three arthesian bores (Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 257). Given the current water capacity, Dili can support only 145,297 people. Table 6 provides a rough estimate of total possible population that can be supported.

**Table 6**: *Population That Can Be Supported With Water Supply, Dili*

| Source of Water | Max. Prod. Capacity (L/S) | Effective Prod. Capacity (L/S) | Total Possible Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 intermittent rivers and 3 artesian bores | 155[a] | 110[a] | 145,297[b] |

*Legend*: a → (Bappeda 1994, p. 257)

b → Estimate based on present trends

Calculations were based on the equations provided by Peter Newman *et al.* (1995, p. 17), as follows:

a. To determine the population that can be supported:

[Water use/head/year = Total water use/year ÷ Population]

(Currently, water use/head/day ± 90 litres)

b. To determine possible population:

[Possible population = Total supply ÷ Water use/head/year]

Assumptions made:

- The use of current technology and present trends.
- To determine the possible population that can be supported with Dili's water resources it is assumed that water use per capita, 90 litres daily, will remain the same in the future.

It is apparent that in terms of water supply, Dili may have the ability to accommodate no more than 145,297 people, this being the ideal number. Dili will run into water shortages if the population growth rates remain high (6.28% per year). It is, therefore, imperative to reduce migration into the city and reforest the areas surrounding the two springs that supply water into the city.

The destruction of the landscape of East Timor and the killing of its inhabitants is still under way, and signs of these are everywhere. Hundreds of 'development' projects and huge amounts of money have littered this part of the world, though the overwhelming majority of natives who inhabit this territory have hardly been touched by the benefits of the 'development'. For example, the GDP (gross Domestic Product) was US$80 per capita per year in the 1980s, with an average annual growth rate of 2%. But with a population growth rate averaging about 3.02% per year between 1980 and 1990 as a result of massive immigration, the per capita income plummeted to about US$60 per capita per year during the same period. The East Timorese population continues to be swamped by a rapid influx of *forasteiros*, an immediate consequence of the 'opening' in 1989. This rapid influx of outsiders will certainly make the East Timorese become a 'visible minority' in the near future if the high levels of immigration continue. Immigrants from Indonesia who made up of one third of the 748,000 people in 1990, are better-off in terms of job opportunities and they control small, medium to large-scale businesses. Similarly, while in Portuguese times immigrants of Chinese ethnic background dominated all businesses including trade, today such businesses are in the hands of immigrants from neighbouring Indonesia. Given the limited local entrepreneurial base, the market has been largely in the hands of non-indigenous people (the *pendatang* or 'migrants'); for example, a survey conducted in the late 1980s showed that less than 20% of traders in *pasar* ('mercado') were East Timorese (Soesastro 1991, p. 215). Today, the percentage remains low.

The East Timorese have been treated like strangers and are the most disadvantaged in their own homeland. Life has become difficult for the majority who are forced to live in the new 'hamlets'. Thousands of young Timorese have left school and continue to wander in serch of jobs and for their survival. Whilst some are refused jobs because their names appear on the 'black list', others cannot get a job because a growing number of the posts are occupied by the 'newcomers'. Private investment does not exist. Though the Planning Board continues to 'sell' East Timor's potential, private investors are reluctant to put their money into East Timor, because they fear both for their security and the competition of the military-backed commercial monopolies.

Overall economic growth in East Timor over the past 15 or 20 years has not been a story of success, particularly for the East Timorese themselves. The economy of East Timor continues to be characterised by, *inter alia*, (1) a dominant rural agricultural sector in which more than 90% of the people live, and from which they derive their livelihood; (2) heavy dependency on external markets (Surabaya and Jakarta), which results in a high degree of openness; and (3) an expanding public sector,[25] which has been dominated by central (Jakarta) government officials or the

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[25] The distribution of government and defence sectors was 21.14% in 1990 with an annual average growth of 8.14%; compare with the distribution of mining and manufacturing 0.71% and 1.70%, respectively. Particularly, mining plays a very insignificant role in the economy and is limited to quarrying activities such as, sand

'newcomers', particularly the medium and high-ranking echelons.

Moreover, as a result of the resettlement scheme[26] carried out by the military for better security surveillance, farmers have had to abandon their lands and settle in the unproductive lowlands. Consequently, this has contributed to the deterioration of East Timor's fragile economy. Colonel Purwanto, the Regional Commander of East Timor in 1983 affirmed that 'control of the camps' was a matter of 'security' and not for the sake of 'administration'. 'The main purpose', he stated, 'was to stamp out resistance, not to encourage food production or care for the living conditions of the inhabitants' (*Tempo*, 8 October 1983). This statement reflects the situation that has emerged. For example, the livestock ratio was 0:7 in 1974, but plummeted dramatically to 0:1 in 1980. In 1993, the livestock ratio registered only 0:3. The overall agricultural crops fell from 42,100 tons in 1973 to 12,600 tons in 1976, one year after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. In particular, rice production fell during this period of destruction to about 8,000 tons a year as compared with 25,200 tons in 1974. The production and export of coffee, which has been one of East Timor's commercial commodities, also declined from 5,584 tons in 1973 to 1,329 tons in 1978. One of the reasons for this sharp decline was the restriction imposed

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and stone, in support of the construction industry. Detailed data can be found on the table in (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992a, p. 17).

[26] Since 1977, the Indonesian military has constructed new 'hamlets' alongside roads for the resettlement of those who survived from the killings. Nowadays, more than 300,000 East Timorese live in such 'hamlets', called desa binaan ('guided villages'). Estimations are based on various unpublished documents at the Bappeda (the 'Provincial Development Planning Board'). Compare with (Taylor 1991, p. 58; Schwarz 1994, p. 205).

by the military command on the mobility of coffee cultivators.[27] This military operation, under the name of *pembangunan*, led to monopolisation of coffee trading by PT Denok Hernandez Indonesia, a company owned by some military generals which also carries out major constructions in East Timor. All these have long been the characteristics of the Indonesian occupation under the ostentatious conceit of *pembangunan*. It can be said that *pembangunan* in East Timor is essentially a destruction of the ecology. The environmental degradation as a result of human-induced activities cannot be separated from human rights. Thousands of Timorese have insufficient food and shelter which represents the denial of the most basic human rights, which can be attributed to environmental degradation and the failure of the land to sustain the population.

## Human Rights *versus* Trade and the Dili Massacre

Today, although the importance of the individual and of individual needs is recognised in theory by the West, the USA and its allies, they still remain motionless. The world's indifference to East Timorese's plight is not a result of a lack of heroism from the movement's side, but occurs because the world has become more absorbed by economic, trade matters, and national security than with the infringement of human rights. Examples of these preoccupations include a Memorandum of

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[27] Soesastro (1991, pp. 207-229) provides a relatively good source on various trends.

Understanding for Economic Development and Co-operation signed in Jakarta between the governments of Indonesia and Australia on the 21 January 1992, only two months after the Dili massacre. Likewise, the United Kingdom was cautious in referring to human rights when Foreign Minister, Mr. Hurd visited Jakarta in April 1993. During the visit, Mr. Hurd signed a concessional loan worth £65 million to fund a power station which would guarantee more trade for British companies. One month later, and after the visit of the Minister for Defence, Mr. Rifkind, to Indonesia, British Aerospace announced a deal for the first 24 Hawk jets out of a contract totalling 100 Hawks, worth £500 million (the British Coalition for East Timor 1993). A few months later, on the 14 April 1994, the 'Dili Accord' was signed by the Presidents of the Northern Territory of Australia Chamber of Commerce (Ian Silvester) and KADINDA Timor *Timur* (Alex Sumampow) to promote trade between the two areas, with certain projects and product groups being defined as having priority. In addition, the exploitation of Timor oil and gas by the two countries was not affected by the massacre, even though the legality of such exploitation is under consideration before the International Court of Justice.

Despite the existence of considerable international human rights law and the recognition of the individual, the discourse of human rights remains today an alien language in Indonesian politics. The Indonesian government continues to regard 'human rights' as a predominantly Western concept. Moreover, 'human rights', which has recently become part of post-Cold War politics, has been described by the Indonesian government as culturally irrelevant, and as an attempt to impose Western standards on this 'despotic' nation. The view of Indonesia's elite, amongst them Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in a document on East Timor published in 1992, is that the 'implementation of human rights implies the existence of a balanced relationship between individual human rights and the obligations of individuals toward their community' (quoted in Schwarz 1994, p. 250). The same view is strongly defended by Malaysia, Singapore, China and Burma, states that continue to oppress their own peoples. So, whilst East Timor continues to be on the international agenda, economic and trade factors which have determined the relationship between certain countries and Indonesia have even encouraged Suharto's New Order to continue to ignore the United Nations resolutions. Indeed, Suharto's *lacaios* ('valets') are not willing to allow his regime's repressive policies to be criticised by the international community.

The Dili massacre of 1991, the latest episode of systematic violence which has underpinned Indonesia's rule in the territory, revealed that little has changed for the East Timorese. Equally revealing is the statement often reiterated by the Javanese generals that 'people who refuse to toe the line have to be shot.' The army's contention has been that the demonstrators were solely responsible for the massacre. Everyone was forced to believe that the massacre was 'evidence' of a separatist attempt to 'oppose' the government using religion and human rights to camouflage their goals. This was the kind of indoctrination I received prior to my departure to Geneva in a 'diplomatic mission' in 1993, which I neither expected nor felt prepared for. The 'mission' seemed daunting but I had no choice but to comply. I have witnessed, however, that under the New Order all groups that struggled for freedom of democracy were regarded as *musuh pemerintah* ('enemies of the state') and portrayed as representing a resurgence of communism. The massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery, when the Indonesian military fired upon a peaceful procession assembled to commemorate the death of Sebastião Gomes,[28] was seen as *wajar* or 'proper', and as nothing that should be regretted.

If the massacre was seen as 'proper', its impact was profound. Adam Schwarz tells us his story: 'A five-day trip to East Timor in the days following the Dili massacre impressed upon me a picture of a cowed and brutalised populace. Eye contact was avoided, distrust was prevalent and people tended to speak in whispers' (Schwarz 1994, p. 218). In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Santa Cruz funeral procession reflected a spontaneous tendency amongst the youth towards self-assertion, claiming the very basic rights of a human being, which are non-existent in this part of the world. Perhaps the peaceful demonstration was one way to prove that tensions were mounting amongst Timorese who had seen the reversal of all *pembangunan* achievements. Just as the Portuguese were unable to colonise and appropriate the entire region and its peoples and to convert the indigenous population to its customs, beliefs, etc., so the Indonesian Government is unable to determine totally the actions and thoughts of the East Timorese. Just as there was always resistance to Portuguese rule amongst the indigenous peoples of East Timor, so the same occurs to the Indonesian colonialism. The procession in Santa Cruz was a peaceful demonstration against the colonisation of Indonesia. Demonstrations such as the Santa Cruz procession which ended in more than 200 dead and hundreds injured, continue to escalate. For example, two years after the massacre of 1991, a mass-mobilisation was again organised in response to the murder of a Timorese trader by a *Bugis* man (South Sulawesi). A year later, in commemoration of the third anniversary of the massacre, 29 Timorese students occupied the compound of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. The impact of the latter seemed to be worldwide because it coincided with the first day of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bogor. Other demonstrations both in East Timor and Indonesia reveal that resistance to Indonesian occupation will continue to grow in spite of increasing repression by the Indonesian military.

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[28] Gomes was a youth who was killed in another shooting incident inside the Roman Catholic Church of St. António, Motael, during the night of 28 October 1991.

## Failure to Re-Unite the East Timorese

Today, the unilaterally-proclaimed *pembangunan manusia seutuhnya* or 'the development of a perfect/ or complete society' is invoked in the name of Indonesia's national interests, a strategy used by the military to sustain the *dwifungsi*. This is yet another way of sustaining the Java-centred New Order state in this Portuguese ex-colony. The *pembangunan* project, which I have been describing, has been represented to the Timorese as bringing 'civilization' and as a means of 're-uniting' the Timorese and restoring their 'traditional relationship with Indonesia'. Under the present governor, Abílio Osório, two projects have become priorities for he believes that projects, such as, *Program Pemantapan Integrasi* or 'the program for the consolidation of integration', and *Pembinaan Pemuda untuk Memperkokoh Persatuan dan Kesatuan* or 'the education of the youth for the strengthening of [Indonesia's] unity', will create pre-conditions necessary to carry out other 'development' programs. But in reality such projects have been developed to serve the needs of Jakarta's project of 'reunion', which has failed during two decades of Indonesia's occupation of the territory.

Despite the political rhetoric, the bestiality of the Indonesian occupation, is obvious. Aditjondro described it as a 'culture of violence' (Aditjondro 1994, pp. 37-40, 46-54) which involved the violation of the rights of a conquered people in a systematic fashion. Under the slogans of the 'one nation' and 'one society' which have been 'maintained' through violence, the uncompromising and oppressive rule of Suharto seems as unchangeable as anywhere in the 'sleeping' empire. But the use of violence to 'restore order' has been self-defeating. The imposition of a 'culture of violence' upon the Timorese has resulted in positive outcomes. Indonesia's nefarious aggression to 'liquidate' the inhabitants of the 'twenty-seventh province', the dream that did not become a reality, has even compelled the East Timorese to move towards one direction, independence. This has led to an 'awakening' of a *unidade nacional Timorense* or a Timorese 'national unity'. Indonesia's 'nationalist' project has, in a sense, turned into a 'colonial' project, which reveals Indonesia's failure to unify the Timorese with Indonesians, (Anderson 1993, p. 27) at the same time it has united Timorese with each other. In line with Anderson's argument, Mark Berger has pointed out that 'a common consciousness and a sense of shared identity' has emerged 'as a direct result of the overwhelming power of the New Order state,' (Berger 1996, p. 22; Anderson 1993) which has been camoufleged with *pembangunan*. As I mentioned earlier, the introduction of *Tetum* as the language in the Catholic Church's liturgy has created a powerful cultural cohesion amongst the Timorese. For the majority, the language has emerged as a unifying element in their newly found nationalism in spite of Indonesia's attempt to 'Indonesianise' or 'Javanise' the population (Anderson 1993).

The military regards the *unidade* as a threat to the 'security' of the region. Therefore it has become necessary to prevent the crystallization of this unity from within. I have noticed that the present generation living in East Timor is split into two groups; on the one hand, there is a group of *mau-hus* or the 'whispers' who are taken up and remodelled by the military to spy on the locals; their role has facilitated the work of Indonesian colonialism. On the other hand, there is a group that has helped in the on-going struggle for self-rule. Whilst the former has been supported by the *dana tak terbatas* to carry out their pro-Suharto campaign, the latter has struggled on a 'zero-budget' basis to free the homeland from the claws of Indonesian colonial rule. Under Jakarta's *petunjuk*, the Planning Board had been preparing budget 'proposals' for 'unlimited funds' to ensure the appearance of the 'proposals' in the *Daftar Isian Proyek* or 'the book of projects'. It was not difficult to prepare the 'proposals' because they contained a single phrase, that is, *pengadaan dana taktis/tidak terbatas* or the 'providence of tactical/unlimited funds'. But *pembangunan*, can no longer be regarded as the panacea for the Timorese. *Pembangunan* can not delay the emergence of a Timorese national consciousness any longer. Indeed, the natives of East Timor understand that Indonesian 'civilization' is incapable of providing them with the things which might make them forget their concern for dignity.

The worst of the so-called *pembangunan* was that it not only displaced the locals from their primordial ties, but also imposed 'new' cultural traits upon them. This gave rise to serious resistance. The struggle to retain dignity has intensified even more as Indonesians, in the name of *kebudayaan nasional* or 'national culture', continue to manifest their (Javanese) cultural superiority.[29] What is known as *kebudayaan nasional* is the manifestation of a culture grounded on extreme racial assumptions. Anderson (1993, p. 25) described the relationship between the Indonesians and Timorese as that of the 'superior and civilized towards the inferior and barbarous.' However, the imposition of the Javanese culture upon the locals has produced strong resistance and this encourages the military to reinforce their spy system, increase the number of troops, and to maintain a reign of terror. Thus the continuing presence of Javanese troops has literally meant the death of a society and a culture. Hatred has become the only mechanism of survival.

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[29] Javanese culture has functioned as a tool for political, social and cultural engineering under Suharto's New Order state which seeks to assimilate and unify diverse cultures of the Indonesian archipelago in a single way of life, that of the Javanese, who have been regarded as the 'true' Indonesians by the present regime. This criticism appears in Skephi and Monroe (1993, p. 247).

# CHAPTER FOUR

## *PEMBANGUNAN* OR *KOLONIALISME?*

## ADMINISTERING DEVELOPMENT IN EAST TIMOR

### Introduction: Understanding the New Order State

In the last two chapters I have shown that East Timor continues to be the site of one of the greatest genocides since World War II. Indonesia annexed and systematically decimated and terrorised the East Timorese. A third of the population of East Timor has been massacred since the invasion of 1975. But the invasion and subsequent annexation of East Timor by Indonesia which possesses superior physical power, and the desire to subjugate those who are powerless, cannot be understood by simply focusing on East Timor *per se*. There are, of course, a series of factors that have contributed to the New Order's mishandling of East Timor. For example, the majority of writers have been inclined to agree that the New Order state's intransigent attitude over East Timor is possibly due to its strong authoritarianism, the demolition of the Communist Party, the suspension of democratic freedom, the armed forces' *dwifungsi*, Suharto's intractable personality, and the persistence of pre-colonial (traditional) features.

With regard to the latter, Burhan Magenda, for example, has suggested that the Javanese *priyayi* [30] became a power centre during Indonesia's pre-colonial times and hence the Javanese 'have become the main cultural base' of Indonesia's New Order throughout the Indonesian archipelago (Magenda 1988, p. 347).[31] Furthermore, during the emergence of the Dutch colonial state in the mid-nineteenth century, the *priyayi* were recruited for the colonial administration and the armed forces. They have since constituted the most powerful class in Indonesia,[32] at least until the 1970s. Anderson, also advanced the idea that the Javanese *priyayi* constituted an important ingredient in the evolution of Indonesian politics. Complementary to this, McVey (1982, pp. 84-91) regarded the New Order as a *beamtenstaat*, that is, a state which is run by and for the sake of its officials.

Others have tried to approach the New Order state from a corporatist perspective, and via the concept of 'bureaucratic authoritarianism'. There are, indeed, some aspects of these approaches which might be applicable to the New

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[30] The term *priyayi* refers to a distinctive class within the traditional aristocracy of Java which became the *dorsum* of the Dutch colonial state. Anderson (1990a, p. 116) describes this class as 'deriving genealogically from the court, provincial, and village elites of pre-colonial times and overwhelmingly identified in this century with white-collar occupations.'

[31] Brown (1994, p. 118) observes that 'most of the contemporary bureaucratic élite is of Javanese *priyayi* background.' Similarly, Jenkins (1987, p. 17) shows that the majority of Indonesia's elite is of Javanese (*priyayi*) descent, and the pattern of New Order power is strongly influenced by Javanese culture. Likewise, in his cultural argument for the continuity of pre-colonial influences on public life in contemporary Indonesia, Anderson (1990b, pp. 38-45) has stressed the strength and persistence or pre-colonial 'traditional' Javanese ideas such as 'power'.

[32] The incorporation of the *priyayi* into the colonial state apparatus, according to Robison (1986, pp. 14-15), made their 'social and political status' more secure.

Order state. For example, the creation of corporatist frameworks has been to either 'accommodate' and 'manage' private businesses, or 'exclude and suppress' labour unions, in the case of Indonesia.[33]

While I will use some elements, whenever relevant, of the interpretations mentioned above as well as others, for the sake of this analysis, I prefer to approach the matter by looking at the evolution of the New Order state from Crouch's 'patrimonial' interpretation, (1979, pp. 571-587)[34] which sees the president, Suharto, who continues to be 'blind to the limits of his power' (Vatikiotis 1993, p. xix) as the 'apex of the power structure' (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, pp. 1-53).

This chapter consists of three parts. The first is a brief discussion of various interpretations of the dynamics of Indonesian politics. Emphasis will be placed on the New Order state although some important historical legacies will be considered as well. This will be followed by a brief description of the three main periods after 1965 which include: the genesis of the New Order (1965 - 1974); the consolidation of Suharto's regime (1974 - 1984); the cementing of the New Order (1984 - present). In the final section I will look at how the political system is replicated in the case of East Timor under the conceit of 'national unity', human rights and *pembangunan*.

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[33] King (1982, pp. 104-116), for example, discusses the application of the corporatist theories to explain Indonesian political system. More recent works on corporatist theories see (Hadiz 1994, pp. 190-203; 1996a).

[34] Similarly, Liddle (1985, p. 73) describes the president as 'the decision-making hub of the New Order' and, undoubtedly, 'he is much more powerful than any other official.'

## Possible Ways to Comprehend the New Order State

### *1. Politics-of-Order: 1960s*

As a result of a substantial revision of modernization theory, the politics-of-order approach emerged in the 1960s. Along with this was the emergence of increasingly military regimes in Asia, including Indonesia which, in the mid-1960s, was shifting from Sukarno's Guided Democracy to Suharto's New Order. Huntington (1968), who introduced the politics-of-order approach, focused on the role of the military and the creation of a strong state which once in place, was able to regulate any sort of political conflict. In his view, modernization can create problems like disintegration or instability and, therefore, it is necessary to organise and accumulate power at the top to mobilise people to participate in politics while maintaining order at the same time (1968, pp. 9, 11, 33-34). The crisis experienced during Sukarno's Guided Democracy in the 1950s, made the military assert control over the decaying nation. Thus, for many, the existence of authoritarianism in Indonesia through the creation of the New Order precluded such instability.

### *2. Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: 1970s - early 1980s*

Another influential approach that emerged out of the revision of classic modernization theory in the 1970s, was the theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism of O'Donnell (1973; 1979). Drawing on the experience of Latin America, (particularly Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s), O'Donnell asserted that, as the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) in Latin America came to an end and the debt crisis aggravated as the result of a decline in demand for primary commodities, the installment of the 'bureaucratic-authoritarianism' regimes of Latin America, formed by a coalition of 'civilian and military technocrats and the big bourgeoisie', was essential to curb the power of 'unions and left-wing political parties' (quoted in Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, p. 22). In Indonesia, the creation of institutions in the early 1970s, aimed to assert control over society and mass-based organizations in order to maintain order and stability. Both order and stability were believed to be necessary for Indonesia as it was beginning to open its doors to foreign capital and investment. At the same time, the revenues would be invested in an import-substitution strategy, based primarily on consumer goods and textiles. In a sense, it can be said that the New Order political system has some of the features proposed by O'Donnell and, therefore, Indonesia could be considered as an example of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. This school of thought, however, has lost its popularity amongst analysts of the Indonesian political system (Berger 1996, p. 7).

### *3. 'State qua State': 1980s*

Insofar as the two interpretations may provide a legitimate basis for understanding what the New Order is about, they do not tell the whole story. By the early 1980s, Anderson (1983, p. 110) offered another picture of the dynamics involved in the 'emergence of the nation as 'an imagined political community' based on the reconfiguration of the past, including the colonial past, by the emergent nationalist elite' (Berger 1996, p. 11) Anderson's historical approach locates the origins of the New Order state in the structures of the Dutch colonial state. This approach became known as the 'state qua state' thesis, which has also been called 'the historic state approach,' by Berger (1996, p. 11). For Anderson, 'the Indonesia we know today is the exact product of the extraordinary extension of Batavia's politico-military power between 1850 and 1910.' In the late colonial period the state apparatus 'increasingly became the business of a rapidly expanding officialdom, which unfolded more according to its inner impulses than in response to any organized extra state demands' (1990a, pp. 97-98). For Anderson, the New Order state can be regarded as a successor to the Dutch colonial state by claiming the same boundaries as had been laid out by the early twentieth century. In relation to this idea, it can be argued that the New Order state, formerly part of the *Nederlandsch Oost Indies*, had the aim of recomposing a Java-centred imperium and sought to expand its dominion over East Timor, as well.

### *4. Patrimonialism/Neo-patrimonialism: late 1970s*

From the late 1960s onwards, many Southeast Asia specialists were more concerned with order than change (understood as involving an evolutionary process from tradition to modernity). Theorists began to identify possible sources of stability by looking at institutions of pre-colonial character, and an authoritarian state. It was argued that the new political system of former colonies, such as Indonesia, remained patrimonial due to patrimonial political forms that had survived since the pre-colonial period. It was further argued that all modern societies were a combination of tradition and modernity (Eisenstadt 1976, pp. 131-145). Since the concept of patrimonialism was developed, Indonesia has been one of the states most cited. Many writers, among them, Jackson (1978), Crouch (1978; 1979), Roth (1968), Mackie and MacIntyre (1994), Mackie (1993), Brown (1994, pp. 117-135), Schwarz (1994), and King (1982) have adopted the patrimonialism/ neo-patrimonialism approach in understanding key aspects of Indonesian politics. Crouch in particular, observed that although Indonesia 'has undergone considerable economic, social, and political change', its political system under Guided Democracy and the New Order 'still exhibits important traditional features,' which 'seemed to hark back to the patrimonial politics of earlier, precolonial Javanese empires' (1979, pp. 572-573). Although Crouch acknowledged the highly repressive character of the New Order, Suharto was not seen as an unchanged and invincible figure. Rather, he assumed, 'in the long run, the regime ..... may well be faced with large-scale outbreaks of mass opposition which would almost certainly become linked with intra-elite conflict. Such circumstances would force the government to give greater emphasis to straightforward repression and less to the patrimonial buying-off of dissidents in its efforts to maintain stability.' But Crouch concluded that 'patrimonial-style' was 'not likely to endure' (1979, pp. 586-587). The inherently self-defeating aspect of such 'patrimonial-style' is, indeed, evident with regard to continuing resistance as practised by the East Timorese.

In the following section, some of the elements from all four interpretations will be used to explain the New Order state. The Suharto regime is merely the continuation of colonialism, although Suharto himself constantly refuses to admit that there is colonialism. It is suggested that, whilst the power of the New Order state and the personality of Suharto, has expanded enormously since 1966, the power of civil society and its organizations and political parties, has been curbed. Again, the use of repression by Suharto to colonise his own peoples has served as a training ground for the subsequent colonisation of East Timor.

## The Genesis of the New Order (1965-1974)

The period between the 1950s and 1960s is usually depicted as a period where disorder prevailed and political tensions and social instability increased. During the first four years of independence, there were escalating tensions between the *priyayi* and non-Javanese *priyayi* and other social groups in the Outer Islands. The attempt to dismantle the position of the 'bureaucratic *priyayi'* also emerged from political parties that wanted to gain control over state affairs. Although the attempt to challenge the *priyayi*'s hegemony lasted until the early 1960s, the armed forces, instituted after 1945 prevented the intrusion of other social groups into the already established *priyayi*-dominated government administrative apparatus. In order to contain the widespread rebellions in the Outer Islands, there was a significant increase of 'Java-based officers in the high command' and, at the same time, Javanese troops were sent to control the Outer Islands (Anderson 1990a, p. 104).

There has been an increase in the number of Javanese officers since the creation of New Order state in 1966. For example, at the beginning of Suharto's New Order, the military elite was 66% Javanese. By the late 1970s, this figure had increased to 80%. During this time, more than 90% of Regional and Territorial Commanders posted to the Outer Islands (including East Timor), were of Javanese descent.[35] In the early 1990s, the number of senior military officers of Javanese ethnicity remained over 70%.[36] This ethnic bias in Indonesia continues to be one of the most salient features of the New Order state. Writing on Javanese dominion over

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[35] Anderson has documented well the development of ABRI, particularly the elite within ABRI, since its birth in 1945. For details see his report (1988, pp. 137-162).

[36] Senior military officers include top officials of the Department of Defence and Security (minister through the various director generals of the Department), chiefs of staffs through principal staff officers, military academy and staff college governors, and all service regional commanders and chiefs of staff. This information was obtained from the US Department of the Army at the US Embassy in Jakarta (E-mail, Thursday, 11/09/1994).

Indonesia's state affairs, Anne Gregory observed that during the revolutionary period the decision-making elite which was 50% Javanese, increased to 55% and 66% under parliamentary democracy and guided democracy, respectively. The figure remained above 60% under the New Order state (quoted in Brown 1994, p. 128).[37]

By the 1950s the army had not only become 'de facto occupiers and controllers of much of the Outer Islands', but it designed new means to gain political control of the newly-born state. The declaration of martial law on March 1957 for the whole archipelago in response to such tensions, as well as regional rebellions, enhanced the army's ability to bring all parties under its grips (Anderson 1990a, pp. 104). But the ultimate goal behind the desire to contain regionalist rebellions was to 'consolidate the mainstream of *priyayi* traditional doctrine: to lead the masses in traditional ways' and to 'ensure the power of the Centre' (Magenda 1988, p. 351). Military intervention in state administration had not only made it possible for the *priyayi* to 'consolidate their power after the New Order came into being in 1965', but also strengthened the military's position. Indeed, since the creation of the New Order in 1966, the armed forces (ABRI) have given Indonesia political stability, though at the expense of democracy. And thereby, the military (ABRI) began to gain control over both politics and the economy of the new nation-state.

The crackdown on various regionalist rebellions, which were seen as a threat to national unity (for example, the PRRI ('Revolutionary Government of the

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[37] See also (Gregory 1976). More recently, it was found that 60% at the Supra KOREM ('Resort Command') level and 64% at the KOREM level, are Javanese, whilst less than 10% are Sundanese and 1-2% are Bataks (Sumatrans). See details in (Editors 1993, pp. 119-152).

Republic of Indonesia'), the West Java-based *Darul Islam* movement, and the Moluccas secessionist campaign, the PERMESTA), meant the 'beginning of the state-building process' in Indonesia in which the Javanese-dominated army began to play its role (Magenda 1988, pp. 349-350). Just as the PRRI and the PERMESTA were seen as a threat to national unity, so was the independence movement in East Timor, FRETILIN, in 1974.

Meanwhile, during Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the state economy was in crisis. Foreign debt and inflation escalated and exports declined. For example, by the first half of the 1960s, the real GDP per capita had a growth rate of -0.4%. More than 60% of Javanese and 50% in the Outer Islands lived below the poverty line, the inflation recorded >500%, the national debt reached over $US2 billion, smuggling was rampant throughout the archipelago (Hill 1994, pp. 55-57). The economic situation deteriorated 'during the late Sukarno's years, as the result of the President's deeply anti-foreign capital and imperialist rhetoric as well as his ideological commitment to an Indonesia which would be strong and industrialised through a largely authochnonous development path' (Hadiz 1996a, p. 120).

In 1965 this combination of factors resulted in the launching of a coup by a group of 'radical-nationalist middle-ranking officers'. This ended in the murder of six army officers. Accused of being the 'instigator' of these murders (Hadiz 1996a, p. 114), General Suharto, the Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) commander, who had assumed control of the army in October 1965, demolished the Indonesian Communist Party by killing its members and supporters who by that time, consisted of more than 80% Javanese non-*priyayi* (i.e. Javanese lower classes, *santri* and peasants, *abangan* of the central and eastern provinces of Java). 'The scale of the killings and the unimaginable brutality with which they were carried out, is hard for even those who witnessed them to describe' (Vatikiotis 1993, p. 35). Moreover, the annihilation of the PKI 'not only removed the most important source of mass mobilization that had arisen before 1965, but also served as a terrifying warning to those who might have been inclined to seek mass support for radical causes during the period of the New Order' (Crouch 1979, p. 576).[38]

Following the Communist defeat and the removal of President Sukarno in 1967 through the famous *Supersemar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* or 'Letter of Command of 11 March'), Suharto gradually assumed full executive power. From then, the New Order state began to launch a policy of mass depoliticization, known as 'floating mass politics', where ordinary people were distanced from the political process and were only allowed to vote once every year. The policy also prescribed the amalgamation of various Muslim parties as well as non-Muslim parties. The result was the formation of the PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or the United Development Party; and the non-Muslim party the PDI, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* or the Indonesian Democratic Party. The Communist Party and all its allies were dissolved. Both the 'floating mass politics' and political emasculation of political parties aimed to assert 'order' and to ensure that economic development was not hampered. Under the New Order state, General Suharto instituted a more authoritarian rule, by relying on repression and he eventually concentrated power in the hands of the presidency. This process of depoliticization 'was a factor favourable to the emergence of a new patrimonial system' (Crouch 1979, p. 576).

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[38] Also see (Magenda 1988, p. 354; Berger 1997, p. 240).

Robison (1993, pp. 43-44) has pointed out that, 'the most important step' in the depolitization process and the controlling of political participation 'was the creation by the state of the party - Golkar,' in support of the 'state-elite patrons.' Golkar has won most of the votes since 1971 with insignificant or no opposition. Golkar was a political machine developed to accumulate resources 'both political and financial, of the military, the presidency and the state bureaucracy' (Robison 1993, p. 44), as needed by the state. This 'success' occurred due to the fact that Golkar had, and has, wide support from the military and the regional bureaucracy. In fact, all civil servants have been forced to vote for this state-backed party.

Radical changes also took place in the economic sphere. The New Order began its reforms with the support of a team of Western-educated technocrats (also, known as the 'Mafia Berkeley'), and by 'a dismantling of the numerous government regulations' of Sukarno's Old Order. Also relevant was a shift to market forces and foreign aid to boost trade and production for rapid industrial growth. The economy was directed towards the development of an ISI strategy which was primarily based on consumer goods such as textiles (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, p. 11; Hadiz 1996, p. 131). In addition, Indonesia's major preoccupation has been to re-link its economy with the world economy in order to facilitate the influx of foreign capital and investment. The United States, gratified by Suharto's victory over the war against the PKI, which ended worries about a potential communist bloc in Southeast Asia, became a major donator and investor. The results were promising. From the early 1970s, Indonesia experienced a dramatic increase in terms of trade, and the economy grew at 10.9% in 1968, and continued to grow strongly thereafter (Hill 1994, pp. 56, 61, 63). The 'memories of the repression and carnage of 1966 have faded in the light of the New Order's successful strategy of national development' (Vatikiotis 1993, p. 34). It should be noted that Suharto's success in delivering economic development was a means by which he could legitimise his rule.

## The Consolidation of Suharto's Regime (1974-1984)

The oil boom of the 1970s, provided an enormous amount of money for the regime. This was necessary for the development of infrastructural growth. The oil boom turned the political system into a more patrimonial government, for Suharto now had the power to 'use coercion against resisting groups.' At the same time, Suharto could provide either 'patronage' to his supporters or prevent any access to licenses, contracts, credit and other amenities for enterprises to those who opposed him (Crouch 1979, p. 577).

Although the economic situation improved and the process of depolitisation continued, the mid-1970s onwards was a difficult period for Suharto. The mishandling and corruption,[39] involving the state-owned oil company, Pertamina, the invasion of East Timor in 1975,[40] which weakened Indonesia's international reputation and which created splits within the army, the sharp decline in rice production, and so on, all blemished Suharto's achievements. More seriously, the issuance of a Christian-backed marriage bill and the recognition of the Javanese traditional *kebatinan* as an official religion, posed a risk to Golkar's vote in the 1977 elections, which would jeopardise Suharto's third-term presidential candidacy.

The growing student riots against widespread corruption and increasingly authoritarian nature of Suharto's government, the split in the army leadership, combined with the Petition of 50 demanding political reforms, made Suharto launch more coercive measures (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, pp. 11-16; Schwarz 1994, pp. 35-36; Vatikiotis 1993, pp. 34-37). For example, by the late 1970s through to the early 1980s, new laws and policies were enforced to ensure greater press censorship, abolition of political activity on campuses, the introduction of the P4 (a *Pancasila* indoctrination), the adoption of *Pancasila* as the *azas tunggal* ('single basis') of all political parties and societal organizations.

By the mid-1980s, Suharto seemed unchallenged and he was in 'a much stronger position to demand loyalty and obedience in return for the various forms of patronage' (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, p. 16). Writing in 1984, Jenkins (1987, pp. 13-14), described Suharto's extraordinary degree of power control gained in less than two decades:

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[39] Corruption is believed to have sucked 'one-third of the development budget' (Liddle 1985, p. 78).

[40] The seizure of the pro-independence movement (labelled by Indonesia as 'communist'), occurred in the context of Indonesia's victory over the war against the PKI, thus preventing the formation of a powerful communist bloc, over which the US and its allies were ecstatic to pour huge quantities of money and integrate Indonesia into the world economy.

> Suharto stood at the apex of the pyramid; his appointees sat in each of the key executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. He dominated the cabinet and the state bureaucracy. He dominated the armed forces ... the People's Consultative Assembly ... His writ extended into every department and into every state-run corporation; it reached down, if he chose, to every village ... In short, he had established himself as the paramount figure in a society in which deference to authority is deeply rooted.

## The Cementing of the New Order (1984 - present)

The year 1983 when he was re-elected for the fourth time was another victory for Suharto's personal authority. As Jenkins points out, the re-election of Suharto made him concentrate more power 'at the apex of the political pyramid'. The concentration of power in the hands of the President by the late 1980s, resulted in 'a decline in the political and administrative power of the military.' With regard to this, Schwarz pointed out that 'like the political parties and the civil service, the military was expected to endorse and implement the executive's policies, not share in the formulation of those policies' (Schwarz 1994, p. 37). As the 'presidency became increasingly personalised', Suharto was able to manipulate the rules so as to benefit the expansion and monopoly of his children's businesses (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, p. 18).

As the 1980s unfolded, 'Indonesian society was pregnant with tensions.'

Suharto's commitment to *pembangunan nasional* now brought significant structural changes: there are more educated people and more access to education, and the real GDP per capita has increased dramatically from $US190 in 1965 to $US570 in 1990. Agriculture's share of GDP plummeted from 50% in 1965 to 22% in 1990, poverty dropped from 61% in 1965 to 10% in 1990 (in Java), and so forth.[41] However, there are some indicators that signal growing threats to Indonesia's economic 'success'. For example, the current deficit almost doubled in 1995, from US$3.4 billion in 1994 to US$6.5 billion by the end of 1995; the increasing deficit in Indonesia's current account was partly due to the increase imports of capital goods (from US$39.5 billion in 1994 to US$45.2 billion in 1995) and the decline of non-oil exports by 23.84% in 1993.[42] Also, Vatikiotis has pointed out that along with such extraordinary achievements, income disparities have widened and 'created pockets of opulence and wealth juxtaposed with lacunae of neglect and poverty' in spite of government claims of achieving progress in eradicating poverty. The wealth goes to a minority group including Suharto's children who control the economy of the country. Schwarz has pointed out that in recent years, every single major construction project has to be approved and or shared by Suharto's children or relatives.[43] Since 1989, Vatikiotis continues, student protests, both in the name of the poor and dispossessed, and the demand for political reform, have increased throughout the nation. The New Order's classic response to this unrest has been to implement measures to ensure order. Interestingly, however, the student unrest 'occurred against a less voluble, but nonetheless detectable unhappiness in elite circles.' Some of the elites within the 'military and civilian leaders of Golkar began to lend tacit support to calls for openness ... [by] describing *Pancasila* as an 'open ideology'' (Vatikiotis 1993, pp. 114-115).

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[41] Random figures were taken from Hill (1994, p. 57).

[42] See more details in Mallarangeng and Liddle (1996, pp. 109-112).

[43] On the involvement of Suharto's children and relatives in robust business empires, see Schwarz (1994, pp. 136-144).

The implication of such social unrest vis-a-vis government's economic achievements is that, 'the institutions of the New Order, ... are poorly equipped to accommodate the new aspirations emanating from civil society.' The emergence of 'a spate of officially unrecognised political parties, associations and workers' organisations', has become a threat to the existing 'formally recognised institutions' (Hadiz 1996b, p. 4).

With regard to human rights issues, the New Order state continues to defend its position, particularly over the issue of Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, by relying upon cultural interpretations of human rights which have prevailed in the past. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, maintains that 'Indonesia's culture and its ancient and well-developed customs have traditionally put high priority on the rights and interests of the community,' thus regarding the western concept of human rights as alien. Similarly, in his attempt to distance the West's criticism of human rights in Indonesia, Suharto, in a speech delivered to the United Nations in 1993, affirmed that 'the right to be free from poverty' was the realisation of human rights. The obsession of maintaining 'national unity', particularly in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East

Timor where separatist movements are still alive, made the ABRI continue to play its role in curbing the insurgencies in these areas. However, the government's claim to have delivered economic development, which is believed to be the realisation of human rights, proved the contrary. Referring to East Timor, the most troublesome issue in Indonesian history, Vatikiotis observed that, 'demands for self-determination began to be heard from a generation who were supposed to have been raised to forget the past and enjoy the fruits of better access to welfare' (1993, pp. 169, 187).

East Timor, continues to be the source of 'constant embarrassment' in the New Order's political trajectory since 1975. In fact, the New Order state has been 'accused by its critics of colonial annexation' (Mackie and MacIntyre (1994, p. 44), in spite of huge amounts of money being poured into the disputed territory for its *pembangunan*, which brought about material progress to some sections of its inhabitants. Just as Salazar succeeded in imposing 'order' in the Portuguese empire, so did Suharto. The latter introduced the 'order' that he needed to continue with his presidency and to develop his colonisation strategy both in Indonesia and East Timor.

## The Replication of the New Order in East Timor

After the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in East Timor in 1974, the eight-year old New Order state apprehensive of a communist insurgency on its doorstep, invaded the territory. Following the consolidation of the New Order state, and as soon as Suharto felt secure, he began to increase repression in all spheres of life. The repressive measures used were essentially the same as those of Portuguese colonialism. Under the New Order state, the colonisation of East Timor began with the implementation of various strategies ranging from the construction of roads, bridges to the resettlement of the indigenous peoples in new 'hamlets'. The scheme showed the continued trend towards widening the scope of the communication infrastructure to create conditions for better military control over the territory. In the name of *pembangunan*, the New Order state has instituted a far more deadly form of colonialism. Initially, the *pembangunan* of East Timor was carried out in four phases: (1) *Normalisasi* (between 1976 and 1977); (2) *Konsolidasi* (1977-8); (3) *Stabilisasi* (1978-9), and (4) Short-term planning (1979-82). These stages were followed by the Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Development Plans, respectively. The first three phases were carried out by a team based in Jakarta called the Central Development Executive Team which was chaired by General L. B. Murdani. The main objective of the first three phases of this unique 'development' model was to relocate the natives living in the mountainous interior into roadside settlements in the lowlands. These areas are more susceptible to soil erosion and less fertile as compared to the former native settlements. The military has played a great role in inventing such 'hamlets' since the late 1970s, during which Suharto signed the bill annexing the territory into the Indonesian Republic. The new settlements were called *desa binaan* or 'supervised hamlets', which were a replication of the 'strategic hamlets' introduced by the US army in Vietnam. In the Planning Board where I was employed, the planning document of the resettlement scheme was named *pembinaan desa* or 'village guidance'. Each *desa* is guided by the *Babinsa* (*Bintara Pembina Desa*, which literally means 'Village Guidance Official') and *Binpolda* (the Indonesian word for *Bintara Polisi Desa* or 'Village Police Official'). These form a military team which aims to 'brainwash' the civilians. They carry out programs, such as, marching, singing Indonesian (national) songs, the *Pancasila*, and so on. Following the implementation of this transplantation scheme, was the destruction of peoples' homes, which could never be rebuilt.

Whilst the people abandoned their land and were not allowed to move from one *desa* to another or go back to their plantations, PT Denok Hernandez Indonesia, a company which was established by generals close to Suharto, began to appropriate coffee, copra, sandalwood, and cumin plantations, as well as marble. The company eventually controlled the production and sale of coffee in such a way that all coffee producers had to sell the commodity to the company at a low price. This created new strains among coffee growers. Dissatisfaction with prices and the dishonesty of the Indonesian troops were inevitable. When Mario Carrascalão, the Indonesian-elected governor assumed power in 1982, he struggled with the problem and in a move to address the coffee growers concerns about the monopoly, introduced co-operatives. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be a final answer to the growers' dissatisfaction, for over time the co-operatives themselves became corrupt.

The relocation facilitated military control of pro-independence guerillas.

Under such control, the military implemented its notorious program to exterminate all sorts of threats to security. The mobility of the population was extremely limited, and only with a *surat jalan* or 'travel permit' could the settlers leave the *desa*. Those who tried to escape from their *desas* were executed or tortured to death. Today the Indonesian government claims that the relocation was carried out on the grounds that the inhabitants in their thatched huts and mountain villages, were living in unhygienic and backward conditions. As I mentioned earlier, this policy was intended, eventually, to 'Javanise' Jakarta's self-proclaimed 'twenty-seventh Province' by overlaying and modifying the fundamental structure of traditional life. Before the invasion and occupation, the natives, relying mostly on agriculture, had lived in their *povoaçoës* ('villages') dispersed throughout the countryside. Today, however, the natives would be considered as *masyarakat maju* (a 'modern society') as they have renounced their cultural uniqueness, *lulic* ('heirlooms'), and their jungle existence, which were derided by their colonialist 'masters' as 'primitive'.

As has already been mentioned, a project of this size resulted in considerable environmental degradation in the new settlement areas. Indeed, the levels of soil erosion and salinity are currently high and lower the land's present and future capacity to sustain the population.[44] Recently, a traveller writer, Lewis (1993, p. 122) described the plains between Fuiloro and Lospalos, some 200 kilometres east of Dili, as a 'dead earth':

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[44] As an example of the declining of carrying capacity to sustain animals and human beings is an area of 400 hectares of land sorrounding lake Taci Tolo, some 5 kilometres to the west of Dili which used to be a place where penguins and other migratory birds made their seasonal stay. However, the place has been reported to have suffered from irreversible damage: the water salinity has reached 35% and the whole area has been cleared several times for military training. In 1990, some ecologists conducted a study of the area and it was concluded that the damage was so severe that it would need 15-20 years in order to return the area into its initial

> Down by the sea there had been villages, and faint rectangles drawn on the charcoal marked where the houses had stood ... Regular cultivation of the soil had come to an end with benefit to spontaneous and unaided growth ... The dead earth was marked out with what might have been taken for the inscriptions or traceries of pre-historic man, or even space invaders. Rice paddies had been cut out here, tended, irrigated and fertilised for generations, and now what remained were meticulous geometrical shapes growing wildflowers...

Land degradation in the new settlement areas has received little attention from the bureaucracy. Indonesia has practised the same environmentally destructive policies in other regions. To give an example of the lack of attention to the environment in East Timor, between 1985 and 1992 only 0.3% of the total budget was allocated to environmental projects, whereas 5.3%, not including the *dana tak terbatas* or 'unlimited funds', was allocated for the *desa binaan* project during the same period. In 1992 alone, the amount of funds for the resettlement project, which was carried out by the OPSTER (its Indonesian term for military territorial operation), registered 3.9% of the total budget of the fiscal year, whereas only 0.6% out of the budget was allocated for the environment. And it is unlikely that these environmental concerns would be addressed immediately or perhaps the inhabitants would have to survive with such impoverished lands until they were given the right to sustain, shelter and to control their lives and futures. Moreover, the lack of funds

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stage. The study was carried out under the project called *Pengembangan Kawasan Pariwisata Taci Tolo* ('Development Plan of Taci Tolo Touristic Region'), which I worked as the team leader.

for the protection of the environment partly reflects the fact that land degradation is a serious problem in these *desa binaan*, and perhaps the New Order state continues to deny the most basic human rights.

Since the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor, not only has its landscape been changed by the ravages of insensitive *pembangunan*, but also its natives have begun to suffer a devastating demographic collapse. In trying to destroy stable native settlements through the 'resettlement' scheme, or 'adjust' them to the new 'needs', the military killed thousands of Timorese under what they called *pembangunan*. Ruthlessly proclaiming its 'twenty-seventh Province', the Indonesian military, intensified their attacks on civilians and FRETILIN bases in the mountains; these attacks resulted in a significant loss on the Indonesian side. This military setback infuriated the soldiers so they launched a devastating security operation called *Operasi Sapuh Bersih* (the 'Wipe Out Operation') that raised the death toll of civilians. For the creation of a 'normal' condition, as it is believed by the military, it was necessary to carry out 'development' programs. And to 'normalise' the situation, it was necessary to 'wipe out' all opposition by the *pejuang kemerdekaan* ('independence fighters') This statement was reiterated several times by blood-thirsty Javanese generals such as, Benny Murdani, the Commander in Chief responsible for the widespread depopulation of indigenous society in East Timor.

As the resistance bases were destroyed, particularly their food capacity, a significant number of civilians and a small number of guerilla fighters were forced to surrender because they were dying of starvation. Bringing the population down from the mountains, Indonesia told the world that 'old brothers are now reunited'. That vague formula of unity was called *konsolidasi* and *stabilisasi*, though some have termed it as 'encirclement and annihilation' (Taylor 1991, pp. 85-90). The newly-surrendered were herded into 'hamlets' under extensive surveillance. Later, many were reported to have been tortured to death.

The wish to *sapuh bersih* ('wipe out') the natives and punish the 'rebels' who refused to compromise with the 'wants' of the colonisers, failed. Therefore a different strategy was used by the military; this time the military promised an avalanche of 'new' things such as, houses, education, and money if the 'rebels' surrendered, under what was then called *moris diak* (i.e., the two words adopted from *Tetum* meaning to 'live better'). The 'new' things were represented by 'Indonesian civilisation'. For this propaganda to be successful, the *dana tidak terbatas* ('unlimited funds') in the *pembangunan* budget were used. There was no supervision and regularisation of the use of such funds and, obviously, corruption became more prevalent as allocations became greater.

## Conclusion

As the 1990s unfold, Suharto continues to stand at the apex of the New Order's complex structure of economic and political power. The ABRI officers have been put under his control, by advancing their careers, financial and political opportunities, but very much at the expense of democratic freedom and human rights. The highly complex structure of economic and political power is needed by Suharto in order to sustain his presidency and to carry out his own colonisation schemes. But, perhaps student riots, labour and peasant unrest, etc., signal that Indonesia's younger generation who live in Java have begun to realise that, just as the East Timorese are a colonised race under the Java-centred New Order state, so are non-*priyayi* and non-Javanese peoples colonised groups within their own homeland.

There are signs of uncertainty that this patrimonialist government is in decline. These include the split within the army leadership in the mishandling of East Timor and human rights in Indonesia in general, escalating protests against corruption and the massive wealth of Suharto's own children and his circle, and discontent amongst Muslim groups. The separatist movement in Aceh, constant resistance amongst the Papuans in Irian Jaya, and the struggle for self-determination in East Timor are additional signs of uncertainty. All these have combined to indicate the fragile base the New Order has been built upon.

In East Timor, particularly, the New Order has radically altered the Portuguese methods of colonial rule. Claiming to have freed the Timorese from colonialism, they have instituted a far deadlier form of colonialism. Under the Indonesian occupation there has been a significant degree of destruction, probably irreversible, of the most vital facets of indigenous culture and tradition. The destruction was, and is, the dominant characteristic of the Indonesian invasion and occupation of the territory. We have seen that for more than two decades of military occupation of East Timor, the *indígenas* have been dispossessed, oppressed, intimidated, and have become exiles in their own homeland. We also have witnessed that since 1975 Indonesia's position has degenerated into a shameful history of expansionism and the establishment of a brutal reign of terror. And all these repressive policies have been implemented for the sake of the aggrandizement of Javanese-centred imperium. When the Javanese landed on East Timor, they identified themselves as *bapak-bapak* ('fathers'), a manifestation of the idea of power in the Javanese traditional conception (Anderson 1972, p. 13; Jackson 1978, pp. 34-35). Most of them still think of themselves in these terms, but they are less ready to accept the term *exploradores* with which they are also endowed. Under the *Estado Novo*, the Catholic Church also laid down similar paternalisitc values through its education system. The 'fathers' of the Portuguese colonialists were the Catholic priests themselves who, provided spiritual and emotional help to their followers. In return, the followers were asked to pay respect to their leaders, including political leaders. Thus, both the Portuguese and Indonesian colonisers have demanded that the East Timorese comply with the norms and rules imposed by the colonisers. Within such a traditional perspective of 'fathership', all forms of political and ideological confrontations are unacceptable.

The desire to 'develop' and 'modernise' East Timor has helped Indonesians to achieve their expansionistic ethos; today the economy of this region is in the hands of outsiders, mostly the military-business people who have achieved enormous power due to the direct support of the military. Land and property have been seized by the military and then transferred to the rapacious business people. Whilst the Indonesian troops are positioned on top of the mountains to contain the guerillas, they help to keep people off their lands and property. The people here live under the shadow of the Indonesian guns. The Timorese are paralysed by fear. But they call this *pembangunan*.

The general conclusion that can be drawn from the replication of the New Order in East Timor is that, the experience has been characterised by the subjugation, intimidation, and terror of a tiny but still-alive nation, which was never a threat to Suharto's New Order. I conclude this chapter by quoting Blauner's general statement on colonialism (1969, p. 395):

> Colonialism traditionally refers to the establishment of domination over a geographically external political unit, most often inhabited by people of a different race and culture, where this domination is political and economic, and the colony exists subordinated to and dependent upon the mother country. Typically the colonisers exploit the land, the raw materials, the labour, and other resources of the colonised nation; in addition a formal recognition is given to the differeneces in power, autonomy and political status, and various agencies are set up to maintain this subordination.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# CONCLUSION

## *PEMBANGUNAN*: A NEW FORM OF *KOLONIALISME*

This thesis has primarily been concerned with the colonialism imposed upon a former Portuguese colony, East Timor, by a so-called anti-colonialist Asian country whose leaders proclaim it to be a 'modern' nation. The aim of the thesis was to show that despite its anti-colonialist claims, Indonesia has imposed an even more pernicious form of colonialism upon the peoples of East Timor than that carried out by the Portuguese. By focussing firstly on my own experience and then drawing on the literature that deals with Indonesia's political and economic development I have attempted to outline the way in which Indonesia's occupation of East Timor had followed a similar pattern to European colonialism.

While Indonesia's occupation of East Timor is essentially no different to European colonisation. The Indonesians refuse to admit that they practise colonialism. One of the main features of Indonesian colonialism, as well as of Portuguese rule, was that this colony was maintained by the employment of repression, including military power, over the colonised people. This is evident throughout the colony where military batallions, as well as the police force, are posted in almost every section of political, social and economic life through which 'order' was maintained. Another common feature of Indonesian colonialism, similar to that of Portuguese rule, was the co-optation of certain sections of society into the colonial administration as a means by which the colonisers could win wider support from the natives. Forms of co-optation included jobs in the civil service, material support, as well as land concessions. The incorporation of such people or at least their persuasion through material benefits made the process of maintaining 'order' more effective. In addition, the 'patrimonialistic-style' gave Suharto another distinctive aspect that was present in pre-colonial times, thereby gaining the experience to colonise his own people to colonise East Timorese. Repressive measures have been developed out of Suharto's patrimonial leadership.

Under Portuguese rule, only 0.25% of the population, which comprised the *mestiços* and the 'civilised' natives, were given privileged status because they were economically better off, spoke Portuguese and had an acceptable behaviour according to the Portuguese colonial rule. The majority, however, continued to live under the yoke of ignorance and poverty. The assimilated-unassimilated system tended to present more favourable social and economic terrains for the betterment of a small number of people. For example, the unassimilated natives were dispossessed from their fertile lands and forced to work, at low wages and longer hours, in the plantations of the *mestiços*. Whilst the former were forced to cultivate on less fertile lands that did not even belong to them, the *mestiços*, including the Catholic Church, accumulated capital at the expense of the unassimilated natives.

This form of colonisation was also apparent, as it was shown, in the workforce; the *mestiços* and 'civilised' natives were given better jobs, whereas the indigenous natives were employed as drivers, cleaners and clerks, a situation that best suited the colonisers to implement their colonisation programs.

These models of colonisation continue to be replicated under Indonesian rule. Although it is true that the *mestiços* and 'civilised' natives are non-existent under the present regime, there are two groups, perhaps related to each other, the new elite group of Timorese who are regarded as loyalists and the *bufos* or 'spies' who are mobilised by vested interest groups and the military to facilitate the colonisation process. Both groups have enjoyed the benefits of 'development'. The creation and mobilisation of such groups helps perpetuate political acquiescence of the masses, a condition that is necessary to maintain Indonesia's control over East Timor. Just as the P.I.D.E. was instituted under the *Estado Novo* to curb any political insurrection, the *bufos* have become one of the main instruments of military surveillance in the context of promoting terror and intimidation amongst the East Timorese. Moreover, these groups in conjunction with the migrants have appropriated fertile lands and coffee, copra, sandalwood plantations that were left by the owners. For example, since the late 1970s, the natives who survived the killings were subsequently herded into new 'supervised hamlets' under the *Operasi Teritorial* scheme. Being forced to abandon their lands and property, a small elite, backed by Javanese generals close to President Suharto in Jakarta, appropriated the lands and property. Moreover, fertile lands have been taken from the natives for *transmigrasi* programs. *Transmigrasi*, which is regarded by Indonesia as necessary for the 'development' of East Timor, has led to a permanent dislocation of Timorese, their beliefs, traditions, and dignity.

Meanwhile, such models of colonisation are also evident in the workforce. Today, the indigenous Timorese hold non-professional jobs and only a very small percentage of people are given quasi-professional jobs. The latter are in the hands of the small group of people who were either former members of the APODETI (the pro-integration party) or obedient and loyal to the present regime, while the majority of the people either work in low-ranking positions or are jobless. The attempt to create an elite which is neither economically nor professionally powerful, is perhaps necessary to maintain the Indonesian colonial system in place and, at the same time, to expand and entrench the Java-centred imperium.

Also, a method used by both the Portuguese and Indonesians to prevent the emergence of 'nationalist' movements was demonstrated in the education system. For example, whilst students were taught Portuguese history, geography and culture from the coloniser perspective, the East Timorese heroes were excluded from history. Moreover, ***Tetum***, the East Timorese *lingua franca*, was not allowed by the Portuguese at schools on the basis that it would discourage the widespread use of Portuguese. Likewise, under Indonesia's occupation, students have been forced to learn Indonesian culture, history, geography, ideology and Indonesian. Everything that sounds Portuguese, including the language, was excluded from schools and public usage. The strategy to eradicate past memories has been as an attempt to undermine Timorese culture and impose an 'Indonesian/Javanese' culture, which remains alien in this part of the world.

The New Order state has supported and encouraged migrants into East Timor to carry out the process of 'Indonesianisation/ Javanisation'. Throughout the thesis and particularly Chapters 2 and 3, I have shown the constant increase of immigration levels which have significantly changed the population pyramid of East Timor and its environment. Thus, continuing increase in the number of migrants in East Timor will ensure the on-going process of 'Indonesianisation/Javanisation' of Timorese.

The presence of migrants also has influenced the relationship between Timorese, the colonised, and the migrants, the colonisers. The relationship between the two has resembled in the use of the term *Bapak* or 'Father' which is attributed to migrants. This has had a deep psychological effect. The colonisers continue to regard themselves as superior and the colonised inferior. The latter is taught to respect the former by obeying the law because only through this way the colonised could be considered as 'true' Indonesians. But this process of subjugating Timorese to the new life style, traditions, ideology, etc. is not without the support of the military which has long played a significant role in the Indonesian political and economy trajectories.

To complete the process of 'Indonesianisation/Javanisation', the New Order state instituted a series of repressive measures in order to crackdown on resisting groups in East Timor while, at the same time, provide 'patronage' to its supporters. The institution of coercion and violence has become the strategy that the state can confidently use against 'nationalist' movements, both in Indonesia and East Timor, which are regarded as a threat to stability and unity of the country. It has been shown, indeed, that Indonesia's 'development' scheme in East Timor, itself is inextricably associated with the continuation of colonialism and, hence, has produced and strengthened the 'nationalist' movement in East Timor. This thesis has shown that there is a correlation between Indonesia's 'development' scheme in East Timor and the emergence of a stronger and more organised 'nationalist' movement which was still embryonic under Portuguese rule. However, it has been shown that the East Timorese are not simply struggling against Indonesia's repression which must be carried out by Indonesian themselves. Rather, Timorese are mainly struggling against Indonesian colonialism. The fight against Indonesian colonialism, it is expected, may eventually lead to a decline in the use of repression in Indonesia. Notwithstanding, the difficult situation in which it operates, the pro-independence movement, backed by the present generation in East Timor, continues to make its own history in the face of *pembangunan*.

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